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RANDOMIZATION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares 
I. Introduction 
 In the eyes of most jurists and constitutional 
commentators, checkpoint searches symbolize the exact 
antitheses of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. No 
matter whether the checkpoints operate on a randomized or 
exhaustive basis, whether they entail immediate searches 
or discretionary referrals to a secondary site, courts and 
commentators typically use the checkpoint to illustrate 
police searches that do not satisfy a central requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment—namely, individualized suspicion. 
Justice O’Connor sums up the standard view: “For most of 
our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches 
have been generally considered per se unreasonable within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”3 Naturally, there 
are exceptions in cases of exigent circumstances—an 
emergency road block designed to catch a fleeing felon is 
one notable example—but under ordinary circumstances, 
checkpoints are almost universally condemned for violating 
the central tenet of individualized suspicion that lies at the 
heart of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
 The problem with this conventional account is that it 
conflates the suspicionless nature of the checkpoint search 
with the randomized aspect of the search. The two 
ingredients—lack of suspicion and randomization—are 
collapsed in the constitutional analysis, as if “random” 
necessarily means “suspicionless.” This conflation is 
illustrated well in the constitutional debates over random 
drug testing, border patrol checkpoints, and administrative 
inspections, where the controversy inevitably turns on the 
costs to privacy of having suspicionless searches versus the 
benefits of evenhandedness that flow from randomized 
searches. The conflation of the suspicion and 
randomization elements ultimately reinforces the negative 
view of checkpoint searches.  
 We take a different view: we contend, first, that the 
model of the checkpoint should serve as the loadstar for 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and that the 
concept of “individualized suspicion” should be, well, 
                                                            
3 Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
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abandoned. Randomization is crucial to promoting the 
value of evenhandedness, which is necessary to achieve the 
goal of controlling discretion, a goal that lies at the very 
heart of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. We also argue, 
second, that randomized searches by definition are 
accompanied by a certain level of suspicion. The 
constitutional issue, we maintain, should not turn on the 
question of suspicion-based versus suspicionless police 
encounters with individuals, but on the level of suspicion 
that attaches to any search program and on the 
evenhandedness of the program. In essence, we argue for a 
new paradigm of randomized encounters that satisfy a base 
level of suspicion in order to capture the benefits of both 
privacy-protection (by ensuring a minimum level of 
suspicion) and evenhandedness (by cabining police 
discretion).   
The notion of reasonableness at the core of the 
Fourth Amendment has a few aims. Two of the most 
important are controlling police discretion and avoiding 
discrimination, whether political, racial, or other. Our 
contention, primarily, is that the Fourth Amendment ought 
to be interpreted in a way that best constrains police power 
and makes it politically accountable to those against whom 
it is being deployed. In emphasizing discretion and 
discrimination, we do not mean to slight privacy protection. 
We think randomization protects privacy by ensuring an 
honest and open evaluation of the level of suspicion 
necessary to trigger the possibility of police intervention 
and coercion. 
We begin by noting that the “individualized 
suspicion” concept is based on a faulty understanding of 
suspicion. The term “individualized suspicion,” which was 
born relatively recently in the 1960s, has become today a 
placeholder for the conclusion that a search or seizure is 
constitutional. As such, the term masks the level of 
suspicion that courts do and should demand in police 
encounters, and it undermines the value of requiring 
suspicion as a protection of privacy interests.  
To be more precise, Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has been constructed using an inaccurate 
model of suspicion. The model is inaccurate in at least two 
ways. First, the term “individualized suspicion” is 
misleading in that it implies that suspicion is either 
individualized and meets constitutional requirements, or it 
is not. The term implies that the process of suspicion-based 
judgments is binary. In reality, suspicion is a probabilistic 
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concept. It is, in technical terms, a continuous variable, not 
a categorical one. Second, the term is misleading in another 
way because it suggests that law enforcers come to 
judgments about individuals by evaluating unique 
individual traits. In reality, most individuals become 
suspicious because of the group-based type behavior that 
they exhibit or the fact that they belong readily identifiable 
groups—sex and age are two examples—rather than 
because of unique individual traits. Typically, individuals 
come to police attention because they are young, or are 
male, or are running away from the police, or have a bulge 
in their pocket. To be sure, there are cases when suspicion 
attaches to an individual because of his or her unique 
identification. Arrests warrants executed for a fugitive of the 
law are the best example, and the case of Roman Polanski 
comes to mind here. But these cases obviously are rare in 
contrast to the more typical police-civilian encounter. Let 
us explain.  
First, the proper way to think about suspicion is with 
reference to a probability scale of 0 to 1, not as 
individualized or not. Consider a case in which a police 
officer sees a known batterer assaulting his wife. The level 
of suspicion regarding the batterer is high, at or very close 
to 1 on a probability scale. Similarly, when Roman Polanski 
is identified at the airport in Switzerland on the basis of his 
passport and matched—by full name, date of birth, place of 
birth, etc.—to an outstanding arrest warrant, the level of 
suspicion is again high, at or very close to 1.4 Now consider 
a case in which a police officer observes an African-
American man whose measured pacing, peering, and 
conferring make the police officer suspicious that he might 
be engaged in or preparing to commit a crime. The level of 
suspicion the officer has regarding this suspect is lower 
than in the first two cases we’ve described.5 Note, though, 
that a court utilizing a binary “individualized suspicion” 
standard would find individualized suspicion in all of these 
cases. In fact, the Supreme Court found individualized 
suspicion on the facts of the third case in Terry v. Ohio. 
Note, too, that the binary metric of “individualized 
suspicion” does not give courts a way to distinguish among 
these cases and does not compel courts to spell out how 
                                                            
4 Naturally, someone else who resembles Polanski may have stolen his passport 
and be impersonating Polanski, so the level of suspicion is never really 1. But it 
is very close in that case.  
5 We refer here, obviously, to the facts recounted by Officer McFadden to justify 
his stop and search of John W. Terry in the famous case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968). 
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much suspicion is necessary to trigger a justifiable stop or 
arrest. As it is commonly employed, the “individualized 
suspicion” standard provides courts only the option of 
coding these very different encounters “0” or “1,” without 
realistically giving any guidance as to the quantum of 
suspicion necessary to delineate the binary “1.”6  
Second, the most natural way to think about 
suspicion is in terms of group-based identifiers. For the 
most part, suspicion attaches to group-based traits, 
conditions, and behaviors: the police identify sets of 
individuals with motives, individuals who match a drug-
courier profile, individuals who fit an eye-witness 
description, individuals who are in a specific location, or 
individuals who have the same blood type. In the Terry 
case, for instance, Officer McFadden became suspicious of 
the suspects there because they displayed a number of 
behaviors that McFadden, through his years of experience, 
had come to equate with criminal behavior: walking back 
and forth, looping back to a location, looking around 
furtively.7 In other cases, suspicion attaches to the 
individual who has a bulge in his pants pocket, who fits a 
description in the vicinity of a recently committed offense, 
who throws away a plastic vial at the sight of a police patrol 
car, or who has Florida license plates on the New Jersey 
Turnpike. These are group-based determinations, and 
suspicion potentially attaches to all individuals within those 
categories. Suspicion in these cases is “individualized” only 
in the sense in that it attaches to an individual because he 
or she is a member of the suspect group. In other words, in 
most cases of policing, suspicion does not originate at the 
individual level.  
                                                            
6 To be sure, the courts could distinguish between more or less suspicion in 
these cases and could allow an arrest in the first two, but only a stop-interrogate-
and-frisk in the third. The courts might intervene to weigh the amount of 
intrusion of the search or seizure against the amount of evidence of suspicion. 
But in all these cases, police intervention and coercion is constitutionally 
permitted because the constitutional standard of “individualized suspicion,” 
though indeterminate, undefined, and unquantified, has been met. By contrast, if 
a court were to utilize a probabilistic spectrum standard in these cases, the court 
would have to clearly identify the quantum of suspicion in each case and 
determine whether that quantum satisfies constitutional requirements based on a 
measured comparison between the quantum in those cases and the level of 
suspicion necessary to satisfy the constitutional values underlying the Fourth 
Amendment. The court would have to code the cases along a continuous scale 
and would have to specify what amount of suspicion satisfies the constitutional 
mandate.  
7 392 U.S. at 5-7. 
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By modeling suspicion with respect to a binary 
standard rather than to the more realistic probabilistic one, 
courts have created a mismatch between Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and everyday police work. As an 
empirical matter, only a small fraction of police practice 
involves retrospective criminal investigations in which law 
enforcement officers have sufficient information to identify 
one individual—“the one who did it.” Very few cases involve 
police officers witnessing a known culprit engaging in 
crime.8 In reality, police practice is dominated by 
discretionary decisions about whom to stop and investigate 
based on leads and suspicious behavior—prospective and 
preventative actions that are based on levels of suspicion 
far short of “1.” In the vast majority of cases, what we really 
want to know is whether there is enough suspicion (in 
probability terms) to conclude that the Constitution has 
been satisfied. To use existing language, what we want to 
know is that there is “individualized suspicion” in the 
binary sense.  
It is true that if law enforcement officers were 
authorized to act only when presented with a case in which 
the offender and crime were clearly identified—where the 
level of suspicion is close to “1”—then the binary model 
would fit police work more comfortably and would help 
guide police officers and courts reviewing police officers’ 
actions. But that is far from the case. As we detail below, 
the vast majority of police work is made up of interactions 
with individuals in which the level of suspicion falls well 
below “1,” and there the binary model the courts employ 
offers no guidance to the law enforcers subject to it.  
Let us take a moment here to be clear: we do not 
believe that the “individualized suspicion” standard is too 
stringent or that it asks for too much or too high a degree of 
suspicion. The problem is not that the binary model 
requires that there be practical certainty in all cases—that 
the level of suspicion reach “1.” (It should be obvious that it 
does not, as evidenced by the rule that Terry stops satisfy 
individualized suspicion.) To the contrary, the problem is 
that the binary model does not specify in any way what 
level of suspicion the Constitution requires, and therefore 
                                                            
8 To be sure, in those very few cases, there would be good reason to use a binary 
standard as the model of suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Such a binary 
standard would fit those exceptional cases comfortably, because in those cases, 
the binary and the spectrum essentially coincide. In those cases, the level of 
suspicion is practically a “1” on the probability scale and is certainly a “1” in 
binary terms. But those are the exceptional cases—and they distort the 
functioning of the Fourth Amendment.  
8 Randomization and the Fourth Amendment 
 
courts have completely punted the question. The binary 
model is essentially unidentified, and so it offers no 
guidance to the police to insure that their decisions 
comport with the Constitution. By contrast, we will detail 
here a model of suspicion that realistically produces an 
explicit analysis of the amount of suspicion needed in any 
police case.9 
Another way to say this—a more legally stylized way, 
perhaps—is that the “individualized suspicion” standard 
relies on a “Warrant Model” of reasonable searches that is 
entirely out of step with ordinary policing, which is 
characterized in truth by a “Patrol Model,” and that the 
clash between the two models undermines the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness. Drawing 
metaphorically on the structure of the Fourth Amendment 
text itself, it is possible to think of the constitutional 
provision as itself containing two models—a Patrol Model 
and a Warrant Model. The text of the amendment, as we all 
know, contains two clauses.10 The first clause goes to the 
larger issue of reasonableness; the second, to the 
requirement that warrants issue only on probable cause.  
Our contention is that the Court has created the 
“individualized suspicion” requirement in the image of the 
second clause and embraced a Warrant Model—one in 
which the police must be able to describe with particularity 
the individual or things to be searched or seized. But in so 
doing, the Court has created a fictional rubric of 
“individualized suspicion” that does more harm than good. 
                                                            
9 One further clarification: If someone were to respond here that individualized 
suspicion is not “1” on the probability scale, but “0.5,” and therefore that 
individualized suspicion is, in effect, an expression of the probability scale we 
urge courts to use, we would emphasize again that, especially on that 
understanding, the term “individualized suspicion” is being used in a conclusory 
manner—it overlaps completely with “constitutional” or “reasonable” suspicion. 
It does no independent work at all. What then is the point of using the term 
“individualized suspicion”? Why not call it “constitutional” or “reasonable 
suspicion” tout court? Our point is that it is far better for the police, for citizens, 
and for the courts to define the level of suspicion that attaches to any particular 
situation and to use that probabilistic approach to suspicion to address the 
constitutional question whether there is reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify 
a stop. 
10 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV.  
Randomization and the Fourth Amendment 9 
 
Instead of ensuring a heightened requirement for police 
encounters, the standard actually masks the required level 
of suspicion in most cases. We think that the Court should 
instead craft a standard of reasonableness driven by the 
Patrol Model of policing, which is the reality on the street. 
Such a standard would be tied to the first clause of the 
Fourth Amendment and would assess reasonableness in 
light of the amount of suspicion underlying a search or 
seizure and also with reference to the extent of 
evenhandedness law enforcers employ when engaging in 
searches and seizures.11  
Nothing about what we have said so far requires that 
we advocate for randomization, of course. We could simply 
urge that courts use a more honest metric of suspicion and 
stop there. We promote the concept of randomization for 
two reasons: First, because suspicion predominantly 
attaches to groups, at least in the ordinary policing context. 
When we require a certain level of suspicion, it turns out, 
we have identified a group of individuals—generally, a 
group that contains individuals of different races, 
ethnicities, gender, etc. In order to pick from within that 
group—all of whom satisfy the required level of suspicion—
we ought to use a neutral sorting mechanism. We must 
pick fairly from the group. Once we have decided to search 
within any category, we are in effect searching within the 
group. The only way to do that without injecting bias and 
prejudice is to randomly search the group because 
randomization allows us to select from the group while 
avoiding illegitimate criteria to discriminate within the 
group.  
Second, and relatedly, randomization allows for 
perfectly representative sampling within a group. The only 
way to obtain a fair and representative sample within a 
group that does not skew on other dimensions is to use a 
randomization mechanism. Suspicion-sufficient check-
points  help to ensure that the population touched by 
policing (the population with police and correctional 
contacts) will reflect accurately the offending population. As 
we explain in greater detail below, suspicion-sufficient 
checkpoints avoid the risk of ratchets and 
disproportionality in the arrestee, jail, or prison 
                                                            
11 One other option going forward, naturally, would be to tack more closely to 
the Warrant Clause and actually require warrant-like specificity and probable 
cause for all police-civilian encounters. That would require reversing Terry, the 
Court’s jurisprudence on articulable suspicion, and strengthening or defining the 
level of suspicion required by “probable cause.”  
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populations. What the checkpoint can provide is an 
updated and accurate profile of the offending population—a 
snapshot of offender distributions.12 And that, we believe, 
promotes the values at the heart of the Fourth Amendment 
and of due process, values that require the state to treat all 
similarly situated individuals—here, offenders—similarly.  
In this essay, we argue that the expression 
“individualized suspicion” should be abandoned. But we 
also go further and suggest that randomized stops at 
suspicion-sufficient checkpoints should be the focal point of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness: that randomized 
engagement of citizens offers a better constitutional model 
for controlling the exercise of police power against 
individuals.  
We want to emphasize here that this argument does 
not require that we promote suspicionless searches and 
seizures. Quite to the contrary, the motivation to eliminate 
the term “individualized suspicion” from Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence is precisely in order to focus the 
relevant actors’ attention on the amount of suspicion 
necessary for constitutionally-justified police-civilian 
encounters. We advocate a model of randomized searches 
within groups of individuals who all satisfy a threshold level 
of suspicion consistent with Fourth Amendment values. A 
threshold level of suspicion is a critical element to satisfy 
the constitutional mandate “against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”13 The amount of suspicion, not the concept of 
individualized suspicion, protects our privacy, and the 
method of randomization, not retrospective judicial 
supervision of discretion, will ensure reasonable searches 
and seizures.  
                                                            
12 In most cases, the construction of profiles is actually based on random 
sampling. That was the idea, for instance, behind the IRS audits that were 
conducted to create the “Discriminant Index Function” (“DIF”) used to flag 
likely tax evaders. The DIF was last updated in 1992 based on a multiple-
regression analysis of approximately 50,000 tax returns that had been randomly 
audited in 1988. By using random sampling, the IRS can obtain an accurate 
picture of suspicious traits at a particular point in time. To be sure, there are 
dangers in using profiles prospectively if the targeted population is less elastic to 
policing than the non-targeted population. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, 
Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age 
(Chicago 2007). So using the information prospectively may not be wise. But 
what the randomization unquestionably affords is an accurate snapshot of the 
offending population, and it ensures that the carceral population will accurately 
reflect all distributions within the offending population. 
13 U.S. Const. Amend. IV.  
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Two additional observations. First, where that 
reasonable level of suspicion should lie is a matter that 
should be addressed by the United States Supreme Court 
in dialogue with the American people. Accordingly, we will 
take no position on the matter here. The fact that this issue 
has never been squarely addressed by the Court and that, 
still today, we have no good idea how much suspicion is 
enough to satisfy the constitutional standards of probable 
cause or articulable suspicion (under Terry) is the best 
evidence of the damage that the concept of “individualized 
suspicion” has wreaked. 
Second, the level of suspicion that attaches to a 
randomized search program may often—but will not 
always—be able to be determined ex ante. Once a 
randomized search program has been put in place, it will be 
possible to predict the level of suspicion that will likely 
attach to future searches. However, there will be times 
when randomized search programs are implemented 
without first knowing the exact level of suspicion attached 
to the program. In such cases, a compensatory system 
should be implemented to provide damages (on a 
workman’s compensation model) for the set of individuals 
ultimately burdened by an unreasonable (insufficient 
suspicion) checkpoint search.14  
We begin by discussing the real world and workload 
of police officers, as a way to set forth, more precisely, our 
model of suspicion. We then turn to the constitutional 
doctrine and demonstrate how our proposal accords with 
Fourth Amendment values. Using a case that illustrates the 
contour of our argument, Indianapolis v. Edmond, we 
explore what it means to model searches on a suspicion-
sufficient randomization paradigm. Our argument about 
why randomization, and not individualization, is the most 
helpful construct for Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
comes next. Finally, while it is especially important to 
distinguish between the constitutional question of 
reasonableness and the public policy question of efficient 
policing, we explore some objections and implementation 
issues. It is not always the case that constitutional 
requirements and good public policy will necessarily 
overlap; however, we believe our constitutional paradigm 
allows for best police practices. Naturally for our paradigm 
to work well, a great deal will turn on the pool that is 
                                                            
14 We are not the first to advocate compensating individuals for police 
encounters, (see Lempert, others) but combining a compensation scheme with 
randomization is new. 
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constructed for purposes of randomization, and so we 
discuss in some detail the pooling issues. We also offer a 
number of examples. One preliminary is clear to us though: 
in order to render possible those best practices, a judicial 
commitment to a new constitutional paradigm of 
randomization is necessary. 
II. Grounded Theory: The Reality of Police Practices 
In 2006, NYPD police officers in New York City 
stopped, questioned, and frisked 508,540 people.15 In 2007, 
the NYPD frisked close to 30,000 more people—531,159—a 
record, but one was short-lived. For the calendar year 2009, 
the NYPD stopped and interrogated a remarkable 575,304 
persons.16 And 2010 promises to break even that record.  
By contrast, adult felony arrests in New York City 
represent a fraction—approximately one-fifth—of these 
numbers. In 2006, there were 97,158 felony arrests of 
adults, of which 27,516 were related to violent crime and 
29,053 to drug-related offenses—and some number of these 
grew out of the stop and frisk practices;17 in 2008, there 
were 100,043 felony arrests of adults, which included 
28,296 violent and 28,765 drug-related offenses.18  
There is also a Violent Felony Warrant Squad in the 
NYPD that tracks down individuals wanted on felony 
                                                            
15 Summary of the RAND Report on NYPD’s Stop, Question, and Frisk: Hearing 
Before the New York City Council Committee on Public Safety and Committee 
on Civil Rights (Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Greg Ridgeway, Director of the 
Safety and Justice Research Program and Director of the Center on Quality 
Policing, RAND Corporation), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT329.pdf; see also New 
York Civil Liberties Union (“NYCLU”), NYPD Stop & Frisk Information, 
http://www.nyclu.org/stopandfrisk (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).  
16 See http://www.nyclu.org/issues/racial-justice/stop-and-frisk-practices; see 
also NYPD, New York City Police Department Stop Question & Frisk Activity: 
Reports prepared during the period January 1 through Mar 31, 2009 (“NYPD 
Report”), http://www.nyclu.org/files/NYPD_Stop-and-
Frisk_Report_1stQtr2009.pdf ; NYCLU, Record Number of Innocent New 
Yorkers Stopped, Interrogated by NYPD, May 12, 2009, 
http://www.nyclu.org/node/2389.  
17 See New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Adult Arrests New 
York City: 1999-2008, 
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/nyc.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 
2009). 
18 Id. There were twice as many adult misdemeanor arrests during the relevant 
periods in New York City—206,259 in 2006 and 233,291 in 2008—but those 
are far more analogous to order-maintenance policing and the stop-and-frisk 
model than they are to adult felony arrest practices. Id. 
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warrants in New York City, but its numbers are miniscule 
in comparison to the ordinary felony arrests. The New York 
State Police has a Violent Felony Warrant Squad that works 
in cooperation with every city and local police department 
in the state of New York, and in 2000, for instance, it 
arrested 982 persons for violent felonies across the state.19  
In other words, more than half a million people were 
stopped-and-frisked under a Patrol Model in New York City, 
while less than a thousand persons were arrested under the 
paradigmatic Warrant Model in the entire state of New 
York.  
Even more telling than the raw numbers are the 
reasons given for stops, questions, and frisks by the NYPD. 
The NYPD report for the first quarter of 2009 lists reasons 
for stops, reasons for frisks, reasons for full searches, and 
additional circumstances that attached to the incident.20 
The following table summarizes the totals for each category. 
What is striking is how many of the suspicion categories are 
group-based.  
Table: Reasons for Stop  
REASON FOR STOP NUMBER OF 
STOPS 
Carrying Suspicious Object  4,122 
Fits A Relevant Description  23,053 
Casing A Victim Or Location  51,015 
Suspect Acting As A Lookout 30,121 
Suspicious Bulge  16,552 
Other 34,708 
Actions Indicative Of A Drug Transaction 16,124 
Furtive Movements 81,692 
Actions Of Engaging In A Violent Crime 14,479 
Wearing Clothes Commonly Used In A Crime 8,856 
 
                                                            
19 See New York State Division of State Police, State Police Violent Felony 
Warrant Squad arrest wanted felon, the third in 48 hours, July 12, 2001, 
http://www.troopers.state.ny.us/Public_Information/2001_News_Releases/07-
12-
01_State_Police_Violent_Felony_Warrant_Squad_arrest_wanted_felon,_the_thi
rd_in_48_hours.cfm; see also Patrice O’Shaughnessy, Warrant Squad cops 
track worst felons, N. Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 20, 2008, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2008/01/20/2008-01-
20_warrant_squad_cops_track_worst_felons-3.html#ixzz0SQZa3P3O. 
20 See NYPD Report, supra note 16, at 334-35.  
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 Table: Reasons for Frisk 
 
 
REASON FOR FRISK NUMBER OF 
FRISKS  
Inappropriate Attire For Season 15,119 
Verbal Threats By Suspect 1,027 
Knowledge Of Suspect's Prior Criminal Behavior 2,223 
Other Suspicion Of Weapons 6,005 
Furtive Movements 64,068 
Actions Of Engaging In A Violent Crime 10,822 
Refuse To Comply W/ Officer's Directions 16,874 
Violent Crime Suspected 18,753 
Suspicious Bulge 15,900 
 
 
 Table: Basis for Search 
 
 
BASIS FOR SEARCH NUMBER OF 
SEARCHES 
Hard Object 8,122 
Admission By Suspect 548 
Outline Of Weapon 1,090 
Other 6,300 
 
 
 
 Table: Additional Circumstances  
 
ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
NUMBER OF 
CASES 
Report By Victim/Witness 17,247 
Area Has High Crime Incidence 97,170 
Time Of Day Fits Crime Incidence 66,996 
Proximity To Scene Of Offense 30,563 
Associating With Known Criminals 5,902 
Other 5,568 
Evasive Response To Questioning 33,949 
Change Direction At Sight Of Officer 43,565 
Ongoing Investigation 21,301 
Sights Or Sounds Of Criminal Activity 3,789 
Radio Run  40,917 
These tables demonstrate well that policing is 
dominated by group-based determinations of suspicion.  
A. Studies of Police Workload 
The place to begin, then, is to look at what the police 
do on the ground. Here, the data from New York City are 
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entirely consistent with the best available research, which 
suggests that order-maintenance and preventative 
policing—the Patrol Model—by far trumps policing tasks 
directed to the investigation of serious crimes—the Warrant 
Model.  
  Policing strategies in the United States have varied 
over time. An earlier era of “beat policing” was replaced in 
the 1960s and 1970s—in large part because of perceived 
problems of corruption—with a more professionalized model 
of policing based on heavy reliance on patrol cars and 
dispatching of officers through 911-reponse mechanisms. 
The 1980s, however, saw the pendulum swing back to beat 
policing through the concept of “community policing” that 
eventually swept jurisdictions across the country and, now, 
is viewed as the dominant and preferred model of policing.21 
The result is that, today, policing agencies claim a greater 
commitment to community-oriented policing than they did 
thirty years ago.22  
 Much of the research on police workload was 
conducted during the period of professionalized policing in 
the 1960s and 70s.23 The lessons from those earlier studies 
are consistent with and document two important facts 
about ordinary policing both in urban and rural settings: 
First, that police officers spend only a small fraction of their 
time in contact with civilians on the street—far less time 
than we tend to imagine. As one researcher in the field 
comments, “A major theme of the earliest studies 
concerning urban police officer workload involved dispelling 
                                                            
21 Cite Moore here plus recent Mastrofski piece on prevalence, Stephen 
Mastrofski, et al., The Challenges of Implementing Community Policing in the 
United States, 1 Policing 223-234 (2007) 
22 See, generally, Roger B. Parks, Stephen Mastrofski, Christina DeJong, and M. 
Kevin Gray, How officers spend their time with the community, Justice 
Quarterly, 16(3): 483-518 (1999); Gordon P. Whitaker, What Is Patrol Work? 
Police Studies 4(4): 13-22 (Winter 1982). 
23 See Brad W. Smith, Kenneth J. Novak, and James Frank, Community policing 
and the work routines of street-level officers, Criminal Justice Review, 26(1): 17 
(2001). These early workload studies include E. Cummings, I. Cummings, and 
L. Edell, Policeman as a philosopher, friend, and guide, Social Problems, 12: 
276-86 (1965); Thomas E. Bercal, Calls for police assistance: consumer 
demands for government service, American Behavioral Scientist, 13: 680-90 
(1970); John A. Webster, Police task and time study, Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and Police Science, 94-100 (1970); Albert J. Reiss Jr., The Police 
and the Public (Yale 1971); Gary W. Cordner, Police patrol work load studies, 
Police Studies, 2, 50-60 (1979); Steve Mastrofski, The Police and Non-crime 
Services, in Evaluating Performance of Criminal Justice Agencies 33-62 
(Gordon Whitaker and Charles Phillips eds., 1983). 
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the popular myth that police spend most of their time 
protecting the ‘thin blue line’ between law and order . . . by 
highlighting the predominance of time spent performing 
service and order maintenance functions.”24 The second 
consistent finding is that, of that small portion of their 
workload dedicated to crime fighting, police officers spend a 
greater share in their order-maintenance capacity than in 
their crime-solving capacity. The early studies, in effect, 
revealed that police officers spent little of their time in 
reactive crime-solving activities.25 Since the advent of 
community policing, a number of studies have returned to 
the workload question in part to determine whether 
community-oriented officers are in fact more involved with 
the community and perform even more service-oriented 
tasks.26  
The Warrant Model and the Patrol Model of policing 
do not perfectly map onto the workload studies we will 
review here because the research categories are a bit larger 
and broader. Nevertheless, it is possible to find relatively 
good proxies for these two different models, and when we 
do, it is clear that the Patrol Model dominates the Warrant. 
dominant. Even a crude measure of police tasks makes 
clear that police officers today spend a greater amount of 
their time in the kind of preemptive, preventative, and 
investigative type of policing activities that are associated 
with group-probability assessments, than they spend in the 
kind of crime-response or warrant-execution types of 
activities that are associated with defined or identified 
suspicion. We review three recent studies here. 
One of the most reliable and interesting studies 
details and compares the workload of community-oriented 
police officers (known as “COP officers”) to more traditional 
crime-solving police officers (known as “beat officers”) in the 
same police department in Cincinnati, Ohio. The data were 
collected using systematic social observation—actual 
observations of police officers by trained social scientists—
during a 13-month period from April 1997 through April 
                                                            
24 John Liederbach, Addressing the “elephant in the living room”: An 
observational study of the work of suburban police, Policing 28(3): 417 (2005). 
25 See Cummings, Cummings, and Edell, supra note 23, at 276-86; Bercal, supra 
note 23, at 680-90; Reiss, supra note 23; Webster, supra note 23 at 94-100. 
26 See Smith, Novak, and Frank, supra note 23, at 17-37; Parks, Mastrofski. 
Dejong, and Gray, supra note 22, at 483-518; Liederbach, supra note 24, at 415-
34; James Frank, Steven G. Brandl, and R. Cory Watkins, The content of 
community policing: a comparison of the daily activities of community and 
“beat officers,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy and 
Management, 20(4): 716-28 (1997). 
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1998.27 In all, the researchers studied 31 different COP 
officers over 1,648 hours and 131 different beat officers 
over 1,888 hours, spanning a total of 442 police shifts over 
3,536 hours. The researchers coded the work activities of 
the observed officers minute-by-minute by 125 different 
categories of activities and encounters. The activities 
categories were defined as non-contact as they included  
behaviors that did not involve face-to-face interaction with 
civilians. The encounter categories, on the other hand, 
involved personal interactions between a police officer and a 
citizen. Every minute of an observed police officer’s activity 
was coded using 23 different activity categories and 102 
different encounter categories. These categories were then 
aggregated into a 16-category list of workload, ranging from 
“personal” and “en route/waiting” to “administrative,” 
“order maintenance,” or “ordinance enforcement.” 
 For our purposes, the most important categories are 
the encounter categories that involve, on the one hand, 
“crime incidents,” and on the other hand “investigative,” 
“order-maintenance,” and “traffic enforcement.” The first 
category, “crime incidents,” corresponds more closely to our 
model of warrant policing. It does not map on exactly and is 
probably broader, but it is the closest category. It is defined 
as “Activities involving a response to a violation of criminal 
law, for example searching property, serving warrants, or 
responding to crime calls (e.g., burglary).”28 Serving 
warrants, clearly, maps on well to our category, but 
responding to crime calls is also more likely to trigger 
encounters with identified suspects, especially in domestic 
abuse cases or where there are acquaintance crimes. The 
second category is intended to get at more proactive police 
tasks that tend to include stops, questioning, and frisks—
and more closely maps on to our model of patrol policing. 
This category includes three rubrics: the first, 
“Investigative,” is defined as “Activities involving an 
unknown problem (e.g., checking out suspicious 
circumstances, alarm response, or interrogation)”; the 
second, “Order-maintenance,” is defined as “Proportion of 
time spent on activities intended to maintain or restore 
order, such as attempting to keep the peace and dealing 
with public nuisance problems (i.e., disorderly, drunk, 
noise disturbance, or arguments)”; and the third, “Traffic 
enforcement,” is defined as “Activities involving vehicles or 
                                                            
27 Smith, Novak, and Frank, supra note 23, at 22. 
28 Id. at 37. 
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the roadways, for example traffic enforcement, traffic or 
road problems, road block, or accidents.”29  
What the Ohio study reveals is that, first, consistent 
with earlier studies, the bulk of a police officer’s workload 
does not involve civilian contact or crime-fighting activities. 
Police officers spend more than 75 percent of their time in 
activities that involve either no contact with citizens or no 
crime-related activities. This is, of course, an ancillary 
point, but it remains true even in today’s more community-
oriented policing models.  
But second, and more importantly, the typical police 
officer, whether a COP officer or a beat officer, spends more 
of her time on proactive patrol-model policing than on more 
reactive crime-solving and warrant-type policing. Beat 
officers, for instance, spend about 76 minutes per shift (or 
16 percent of their shift) on average engaged in Patrol Model 
tasks, and 58 minutes or 12 percent of their shift in 
Warrant Model activities. Even using these very rough 
measures of the warrant versus patrol models, police 
officers in this jurisdiction are spending more of their shifts 
engaged in the preemptive, preventative tasks of 
investigating suspicious behavior and maintaining order.  
A second study, conducted by James Frank, Steven 
Brandl, and R. Cory Watkins, compared the tasks and 
workloads of traditional crime-solving officers (“beat 
officers”) to neighborhood officers (“COP officers”).30 The 
data were collected using systematic observations between 
January and August 1995 in Cincinnati, Ohio as part of a 
larger study on the effectiveness of community policing 
efforts.31 Over the course of the study, the researchers 
examined sixteen community police officers and fourteen 
beat officers assigned to the same neighborhoods as the 
community police officers.32 Each officer was observed 
                                                            
29 Id. The other activity categories are of little interest to us either 
because they exclude civilian contact or because they have 
nothing to do with crime. So, for instance, “Foot patrol” and 
“Motor patrol,” which are defined as “Proportion of time spent 
patrolling on foot” or “in vehicle,” respectively, do not include the 
interaction time with civilians; whereas ‘Service,” which is defined 
as “Activities providing service or assistance to citizens, for 
example assisting motorists, returning lost property, giving 
information, providing medical assistance, assisting a citizen 
locked out of a building, or giving directions,” is not crime-related. 
30 Frank, Brandl, and Watkins, supra note 26, at 718. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 719. 
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during two eight-hour shifts: observations of COP officers 
occurred during 59 shifts (totaling 432.20 hours), while 
observations of beat officers occurred during 20 shifts 
(totaling 171.48 hours).33 
The researchers distinguished between crime-related 
activities and other kinds of service and administrative 
activities. Crime-related activities involved a specific 
reported criminal occurrence and included such tasks as 
“serving warrants on suspects, making arrests, issuing 
citations, conducting investigations involving specific 
occurrences, and preparing reports related to specific 
criminal incidents.”34 The study revealed that both beat 
officers and COP officers spent most of their crime-focused 
time conducting vehicle and foot patrol, as compared to the 
amount of time actually engaged in effectuating an arrest. 
The activity with the greatest frequency was “vehicle patrol,” 
which accounted for 22.01 percent of a COP officer’s time 
and 32.97 percent of a beat officer’s time. 35 By contrast, 
making arrests accounted for only 0.90 percent of a COP 
officer’s time and 6.48 percent of a beat officer’s time.36 As 
the authors emphasized, “almost one-third (32.97 percent) 
of all patrol officer time was spent performing routine 
vehicle patrol.” 37 
This is even more true in rural, small town, and 
suburban police forces, which spend an even greater 
proportion of their time engaged in the kind of traffic 
enforcement activities that are generally associated with 
preemptive policing—and also, tragically, in this country, 
with racial profiling. A number of studies have focused on 
the smaller police agencies in small towns and rural 
places—policing Mayberry as it were—and the findings here 
converge as well.38 
In a third study, a recent observational study of the 
workload of the suburban police that used very similar 
methods and categories—in order, precisely, to be able to 
                                                            
33 Id. at 720. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 724 (Table II for beat officer); and 721 (Table I for COP officer). 
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 723. 
38 See, e.g., Ralph A. Weisheit, David N. Falcone, and L. Edward Wells, Crime 
and Policing in Rural and Small Town America (Waveland Press 1996); John 
Liederbach and James Frank, Policing Mayberry: the work routines of small-
town and rural officers, American Journal of Criminal Justice, 28(1): 53-72 
(2003); Liederbach, supra note 24.  
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compare their findings with the existing studies on urban 
forces—the author, John Liederbach, discovered far more 
time spent on traffic enforcement. This study, too, relied on 
systematic social observation conducted over a 14-month 
period between April 1999 and May 2000 and involving 
3,537 hours of observation (the equivalent of 442 eight-
hour shifts).39 The study sites included fourteen different 
suburban police agencies in Hamilton County, Ohio, with 
very diverse demographic, socio-economic, and land use 
variations. Two of the communities were exclusive upper 
income, three were middle income residential, two middle 
income diversified, one middle income integrated, three 
working class residential, and three working class 
urbanized. The study utilized the same coding instruments 
including both activity and encounter categories.  
We can draw four conclusions from this study. First, 
suburban police officers spent 83 percent of their time on 
activities that involved no contact with civilians.40 Second, 
though, and more importantly, traffic enforcement was one 
of the five dominant uses of time and, of those five, the only 
one involving civilian encounters (the other four top 
activities were motorized patrol, administrative tasks 
(primarily report writing), personal off-duty tasks, and 
traveling en route to specific locations).41 Third, of all citizen 
encounter time, traffic enforcement (again) was the most 
time consuming, representing 30.1 percent on average of 
police-citizen encounters, in contrast, for example, to 19.1 
percent for crime-related activities. Traffic problems 
“consumed the largest percentage of encounter time” in a 
large majority of the suburban agencies, as compared to at 
least nine other categories of tasks (including crime-related, 
investigative, and order-maintenance).42 Together, traffic 
enforcement, investigations, and order-maintenance clearly 
outweighed the other civilian contact hours. Fourth, the 
amount of time engaged in actually serving warrants was 
miniscule. The study coded the number of times that police 
officers encountered different types of problem interactions 
with civilians, and the tally is revealing:  
 
TYPE OF PROBLEM NUMBER OF CIVILIAN 
                                                            
39 Liederbach, supra note 24, at 419. 
40 Id. at 423.  
41 Id. at 424. 
42 Id. at 425. 
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ENCOUNTERS 
Patrol-type encounters:  
1. Traffic problems 714 
2. Investigative problems 197 
3. Order maintenance 
problems 
159 
                 Subtotal 1,070 
  
Warrant-type encounters  
1.  Warrant to be served 37 
2.  Other crime problems  378 
        Subtotal 415 
 
The author concluded that these findings “show the 
predominance of traffic issues for suburban officers in 
terms of both the large degree of time that traffic problems 
consumed and the frequency with which these officers 
encountered traffic problems while on shift.”43 The author 
emphasized, “Six of the top problems were traffic related. 
Excess speed was the most frequently encountered problem 
as a whole, and traffic was the primary problem in 29.7 
percent of all citizen encounters across the 14 agencies.”44 
These findings are very similar to the findings in small town 
and rural police departments. 
In addition to these three often-cited studies, a more 
recent 2009 study examining the time allocated to proactive 
and reactive activities by traditional and community officers 
provides further support.45 This study, by Christine Famega, 
focused more directly on the workload difference between 
preemptive, proactive policing methods in the mold of the 
                                                            
43 Id. at 427.  
44 Id.  
45 Christine Famega, Proactive Policing by Post and Community Officers, Crime 
Delinquency 55: 79-80 (2009). 
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Patrol Model and more reactive, 911-response policing in 
the mold of the Warrant Model.46  
Like the three earlier studies, the 2009 study 
collected data by means of systematic observation of 
officers during a two-week period in 1999.47 Trained 
observers accompanied officers during 251 shifts, taking 
notes of the officers’ activities during each shift, and 
recorded 180 types of officer conduct.48 These observed 
activities were then classified as either proactive (defined as 
any “activity initiated by the officer, initiated in response to 
a citizen at the scene, or based on information of 
instructions provided by the police”) or reactive (defined as 
any “activity conducted in response to a 911, 311, or 
district dispatch”).49 
Consistent with earlier studies, the research found 
that the greatest proportion of officers’ proactive time was 
consumed by patrol activities (34.76 percent for beat 
officers and approximately 30 percent for community-
oriented officers). The evidence clearly demonstrated that 
proactive policing far outweighs reactive policing: beat 
officers “spend approximately 21% of their time engaged in 
reactive activities, 50% of their time engaged in proactive 
activities, and 29% of their time engaged in other 
activities.”50  
Although none of the studies map on perfectly to the 
Patrol versus Warrant Models and are, in this sense, only 
rough proxies for our distinction, each one of them 
corroborates the central insight that policing today involves 
far more group-based preemptive suspicion than warrant-
like encounters focused on a particular individual. 
Christine Famega’s study may come closest and its 
conclusion serves well here: “Overall, 50% of [beat] officer 
time is spent engaged in proactive activities, as compared to 
29% of time engaged in administrative and personal 
activities (other activities), and 21% of time is spent on 
reactive activities. Clearly, [beat] officers have a good deal of 
                                                            
46 The author’s own description is instructive. She notes that the point of the 
study is to distinguish “between reactive policing, in which citizens mobilize the 
police to intervene in private affairs (typically through calls for service), and 
proactive policing, in which police intervene on their own initiative.”. Id at 78. 
47 Id. at 86. 
48 Id. at 87-88. 
49 Id. at 88. 
50 Id. at 90. 
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time for proactive work, though most of it is spent on 
patrol.”51  
B.  Modeling Suspicion and Police Practices 
The empirical evidence and workload research 
suggest a couple of ways of visualizing our main point. The 
first works in one dimension, along a spectrum delineated 
by the two opposed ideal types of police-civilian 
encounters—the Warrant and the Patrol Models. At one end 
of the spectrum lies the warrant-type of encounter: for 
instance, the situation where the police have unique 
identifying information concerning a specific individual, 
such as the spouse batterer who has committed the act in 
front of the police or the individual bearing Roman 
Polanski’s passport. This type of encounter is what we have 
characterized fitting into a “Warrant Model” of policing. At 
the other extreme lies a more speculative group-based 
identification of a person for an encounter: for instance, a 
situation involving an apparent truant with a bulge in his 
pocket; or someone who fits the description of the 
perpetrator of a recent armed robbery; or an individual who 
seems to be casing a car or a store. These types of 
situations, when they give rise to an investigative stop or 
search, are what we have characterized as fitting into a 
“Patrol Model” of policing.  
 
The police research suggests that most police-civilian 
encounters are arrayed along this spectrum ranging from 
warrant to patrol models of policing. Not entirely 
coincidentally, the spectrum also coincides with the range 
of probabilities of suspicion. The warrant-type encounters 
are stacked on the side of higher probabilities of suspicion, 
while the patrol-type encounters are arrayed toward the 
lower end of the probabilities scale. We believe, and 
research demonstrates, that most police work loads onto 
the Patrol Model end of the spectrum as opposed to the the 
Warrant Model end, which is also to say that most of the 
time when police officer engage people, they are operating 
on the basis of a probability of suspicion that is  far smaller 
than 1. This is illustrated in the following figure: 
 
                                                            
51 Id. at 98. 
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Probability = 0 Probability = 1
Warrant Model of  PolicingPatrol Model of Policing
Amount of suspicion necessary to
satisfy “reasonable suspicion” under
the Fourth Amendment
P = 0.35
Graph:  Single Dimension along Model and Probability Scale
Terry stop
Batterer arrest;
Polanski arrest
BULK OF POLICING
 
 
 
As this figure suggests, there are, on the right hand 
side, a limited number of police encounters that come close 
to the execution of an arrest warrant for a fugitive or for an 
accused who committed his crime on videotape. These are 
the extreme cases where the level of suspicion is close to 1 
on a probability scale and where the proper model to 
evaluate reasonable suspicion may as well be binary. The 
suspect is “the one” in most of these warrant model cases. 
Reconsider our previous example of a police officer who 
witnesses a known batterer beat his wife. Again, the 
suspect here is almost surely the right person. To the left of 
that small set of cases, though, is the vast majority of 
policing encounters. These cases are far more speculative 
and the probability that the suspect is in fact guilty of a 
crime ranges widely. Individuals may be suspected because 
they fit a description (young black male near the scene of 
the robbery), or fit a suspect behavior (glancing furtively 
while “casing” an establishment), or demonstrate a suspect 
trait (wearing a heavy overcoat in the summer heat or 
displaying a bulge in his pants pocket). The probability of 
the suspicion varies in all of these cases based on the 
group-based nature of the suspicious trait or behavior. 
There is no “on” or “off” of individual suspicion here; rather, 
there are just levels of suspicion that may or may not meet 
constitutional muster. Somewhere along that spectrum, the 
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Supreme Court must draw the line of reasonableness.  
 
Another way to visualize our point works in two 
dimensions. The first dimension (x-axis) has to do with 
whether the police have identified a particular individual or 
whether the police are engaged in purely preventative 
policing. The second dimension (y-axis) has to do with 
whether there is a crime that has occurred and needs to be 
solved or whether the police are merely policing to prevent 
crimes from happening. The two dimensions give rise, 
essentially, to a two-by-two graph where the Patrol Model 
cases (red) can be distinguished from the Warrant Model 
incidents (yellow):  
 
 
In the upper left quadrant, the prototypical case is 
that of an identified individual who has been accused of an 
identifiable crime—say, the battering husband or Roman 
Polanksi. These cases fit the Warrant Model. The upper 
right hand quadrant contains cases, like the famous case of 
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Brown v City of Oneonta,52 where a crime has been 
committed and all the police have is an eyewitness lead 
based on some general demographic traits. The witness 
identification there leads to the interrogation and hand 
search of all young African-Americans in the town. This 
qualifies as the Patrol Model. In the lower left quadrant 
there are odd-ball cases of identified persons whose crime 
has not yet been identified perfectly—for instance, Al 
Capone. These few cases would be characterized as 
warrant-type investigations. In the bottom right quadrant, 
well, that is the bulk of policing: cases of ordinary street 
stops.  
 
It should be clear by now that the vast majority of 
police work covers the bottom right part of the graph. In 
that quadrant (and in the adjoining area above), suspicion 
is probabilistic, and its reasonableness bears little 
relationship to a model that targets a particular individual. 
In these cases we do not really care that suspicion attaches 
to an individual qua individual, rather than to the 
individual as a member of a group. What we care about is 
the level of suspicion that attaches to the group of 
individuals who are identified as sharing whatever 
combination of traits, conditions and behaviors are 
identified and how reliably that level of suspicion can be 
demonstrated. The police do not need individualized 
suspicion in these cases. What they need is the right 
quantum of probabilistic suspicion for the group. Once one 
accepts this point, it should be clear that adding the word 
“individualized” to suspicion is not helpful to answering the 
central question in these Fourth Amendment cases: 
whether the police activity is “reasonable.”  
In truth, the only way to make semantic sense of the 
term “individualized suspicion” in the vast majority of cases 
that lie in the lower right quadrant of the table would be to 
require that the intersection of suspicious group-based 
traits, conditions, and behaviors identify a unique 
individual. Obviously, that requirement would represent a 
degree of certainty of suspicion that is exponentially greater 
than the level of suspicion that courts conventionally attach 
to the term “individualized suspicion” in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Such a requirement would defy 
common sense, and most people would likely find it 
intolerable. 
                                                            
52 221 F3d 329 (2d Cir 2000). 
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We don’t think it is necessary or desirable to  reduce 
the quantum of suspicion necessary to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment in order to pursue the goal of randomization. 
Our goal instead is to propose a constitutional framework 
that allows courts to better define and track the level of 
suspicion police officers and agencies need in order to 
satisfy constitutional mandates. By paying attention to the 
level of suspicion in searches and seizures, rather than the 
individualization of suspicion, courts will be in a better 
position to give meaning to the notion of reasonableness.  
 
III. Rethinking Fourth Amendment Principles 
The Supreme Court has debated the pros and cons of 
randomized search programs in a number of discrete 
Fourth Amendment contexts—such as border patrol 
roadblocks and administrative and public school drug-
testing programs.53 In all these situations, the Court has 
considered the propriety of extending the requirement of 
“individualized suspicion” outside the nucleus of police and 
crime-related searches and seizures. It is important to 
emphasize at the outset, though, that in all of those other 
areas the notion of “individualized suspicion” is opposed to 
suspicionless searches and seizures. The debate is not 
between “individualized suspicion” versus a probabilistic 
notion of suspicion like ours. The debate is always cast in 
terms of a choice between “individualized suspicion” on the 
one hand and no suspicion at all on the other. 
The Court has repeatedly made clear that the 
exceptional categories of searches that are exempt from the 
“individualized suspicion” requirement fall under the rubric 
of “suspicionless searches and seizures.”54 As Justice Scalia 
emphasized in the public school drug testing context, “We 
have upheld suspicionless searches and seizures to conduct 
drug testing of railroad personnel involved in train 
accidents; to conduct random drug testing of federal 
customs officers who carry arms or are involved in drug 
                                                            
53 See generally, e.g., Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); 
Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
54 See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653-54 (Scalia, J.); id. at 667-68 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (“For most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless 
searches have been generally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis added).  
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interdiction; and to maintain automobile checkpoints 
looking for illegal immigrants and contraband.”55  
In that debate—the debate between suspicion-full 
and suspicionless searches and seizures—we fall on the 
side of requiring suspicion, especially in the policing 
context.56 We believe that reasonable searches and seizures 
in the policing context require a certain level of suspicion. 
What we argue, though, is that it is precisely the level of 
suspicion that should be the focus of the reasonableness 
inquiry—along with the evenhandedness of the searches. 
Search programs that reveal levels of suspicion that fall 
below constitutional minimums are inappropriate in the 
criminal justice context; what reasonableness and privacy 
require are a certain acceptable quantum of suspicion. In 
this sense, we do not espouse suspicionless mass searches, 
but rather randomized programs that meet target levels of 
suspicion. We acknowledge that the level of suspicion may 
need to be determined ex post in certain cases and, as a 
result would need to go hand-in-hand with a compensation 
mechanism for those randomized programs that do not 
meet the minimum level of suspicion. We address this later. 
A. Suspicionless Search Programs 
The Court has addressed the question of 
suspicionless search programs in a number of different 
situations. As a doctrinal matter, the framing of the 
question is identical in all of the “exceptional cases” where 
suspicionless searches are or are not deemed 
constitutional. As the Supreme Court made clear in a 
number of early cases, the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant 
Clause is not applicable to all searches and seizures, 
especially not to those that are conducted on the street in a 
volatile or fluid context.57 The Warrant Clause does not 
apply to searches of cars, since they might move,58 or to 
                                                            
55 See id. at 653-54 (emphasis added).  
56 We are only interested in the policing context and, for that reason, do not 
really engage the question of the propriety of suspicionless searches in 
administrative or other non-criminal contexts. We lean in favor of requiring 
suspicion there too, though the level of suspicion could be set lower and 
established after the fact; but we have no deep stake in taking a position outside 
the criminal justice context.  
57 See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); see also U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
58 See generally, e.g., Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (holding that police were not 
required to obtain a warrant for the search of a car). 
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suspects on the street during unanticipated encounters.59 
As such, the probable cause requirement specified in the 
Warrant Clause also does not attach. The Court has, 
however, imposed the same requirement of probable 
cause—and subsequently, in certain situations, of 
articulable suspicion—as the standard to evaluate 
reasonableness under the more general “reasonableness” 
subclause of the Fourth Amendment. It is the probable 
cause standard that has evolved, over time, into the 
requirement that there be “individualized suspicion.” All 
this is standard fare.  
In a line of Fourth Amendment cases, however, the 
Supreme Court has drawn exceptions to the “individualized 
suspicion” requirement. These exceptional situations have 
traditionally lain outside the conventional crime and 
policing contexts and have been justified on the grounds of 
necessity or efficacy. As Justice O’Connor explained, 
dissenting in Vernonia School District v. Acton, the public 
school drug-testing case, “[W]e have allowed exceptions in 
recent years only where it has been clear that a suspicion-
based regime would be ineffectual.”60 As a result, as the 
Court declared in one of the first such cases, Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives’ Association, involving a drug 
testing scheme for railroad engineers involved in a train 
accident, “In limited circumstances, where the privacy 
interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where 
an important governmental interest furthered by the 
intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of 
individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable 
despite the absence of such suspicion.”61 These cases, in 
fact, have spawned a constitutional maxim of their own: 
“the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible 
requirement of such [individualized] suspicion.”62 
The Court has articulated a number of exceptions to 
suspicion-based search regimes in discrete areas such as 
randomized drug-testing in public schools and 
                                                            
59 See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (“[T]he 
judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize 
warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal 
prosecutions with endless litigation.”). 
60 515 U.S. at 667-68 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
61 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989). 
62 The famous passage is originally from United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976), and has been repeated in myriad subsequent cases, 
including Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 643; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 
n.8 (1985); Board of Education v. Earls 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S.843, 855 n.4 (2006). 
30 Randomization and the Fourth Amendment 
 
suspicionless roadblocks at or near the border. These are 
the cases that have given rise to what the Court refers to as 
“the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible 
suspicionless searches.”63 
(1) Drug-Testing in Public Schools 
The first line of cases—Vernonia School District v. 
Action,64 and Board of Education v. Earls65—involve 
suspicionless drug testing in public schools. In Vernonia, 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that random drug 
testing of student athletes did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.66 During the 1980s, drug use in Vernonia 
schools had increased sharply, or so the majority found, 
and athletes were perceived as the “leaders of the drug 
culture.”67 After exploring a variety of alternatives, the 
school district implemented a policy directing school 
officials to randomly choose 10 percent of student athletes 
to drug test each week. If a student tested positive then 
that student had to participate in a 6-week assistance 
program or suffer suspension from athletics for the 
remainder of the current season and the subsequent 
season. 68  
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia 
considered a three-factor test to ascertain whether 
“individualized suspicion” was necessary—looking first at 
the nature of the privacy interest at stake, second at the 
nature of the privacy invasion, and third at the nature and 
immediacy of the governmental concern.69 Because 
legitimate privacy expectations are attenuated in a school 
setting (and to an even greater degree in student athletic 
settings), because the results of the test were disclosed to 
others only on a “need-to-know” basis, and because the 
state has a strong interest in deterring drug use amongst 
schoolchildren, Justice Scalia concluded that random drug-
testing did not violate the Fourth Amendment.70  
                                                            
63 Earls, 536 U.S. at 854 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Chandler v. Miller, 
520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997). 
64 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
65 536 U.S. 822 (2002).          
66 515 U.S. at 664-65. 
67 Id. at 648-49. 
68 Id. at 650-51. 
69 Id. at 654-64. 
70 Id. 
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Seven years later, in Board of Education v. Earls, the 
Court expanded its decision in Vernonia to hold that 
mandatory drug testing for all students who participated in 
extracurricular activities was constitutional.71 The Court 
rejected the Tenth Circuit’s holding that a school must be 
able to identify drug abuse among a sufficient number of 
students and demonstrate that the testing will actually 
capture those groups of students. Applying Vernonia’s “fact-
specific balancing inquiry,” Justice Thomas, writing for the 
Court, found that students participating in extracurricular 
activities had only a limited expectation of privacy and that 
the intrusion on their privacy was minor because the 
information was distributed on a need-to-know basis and 
no authorities would be notified.72 The Court also found that 
the nature and immediacy of protecting schoolchildren’s 
health—even absent a factual showing of a serious drug 
problem—was a sufficiently important government 
interest.73  
The public school drug testing cases gave rise to a 
sharp debate between, on the one hand, Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, and, on the other hand, Justices O’Connor 
and Ginsburg. All sides made significant use of history—the 
first by its absence, the second by its presence. Justice 
Scalia’s historical search for “clear practices” at the time of 
adoption left little room for reasoning by analogy. Because 
public schools did not exist at the time the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted and the drug problem (and 
related technology) is of more recent vintage, Justice Scalia 
found that no sufficiently analogous searches existed and 
therefore relied on the plain meaning of the text. “As the 
text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate 
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is 
‘reasonableness.’”74 And, where there was no clear practice 
either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue 
at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, 
whether a particular search meets the reasonableness 
standard “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate governmental interest.”75 
                                                            
71 536 U.S. at 838.          
72 Id. at 833. 
73 Id. at 834-38. 
74 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653. 
75 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 U.S. 602, 
619 (1989)). 
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Justice O’Connor, on the other hand, relied on the 
Court’s historical treatment of the Fourth Amendment. 
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not 
explicitly require individualized suspicion, Justice O’Connor 
argued in dissent that “[f]or most of our constitutional 
history, mass, suspicionless searches have been generally 
considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”76 Justice O’Connor rested strongly on 
Carroll v. United States, in which the Court stated in 1925 
that “[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a 
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile 
on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons 
lawfully using the highways to the indignity of such a 
search.”77 Justice O’Connor used several historical studies 
to bolster her claim that the framers believed that blanket 
searches were “intolerable and unreasonable,” and intended 
to codify that conviction into the Fourth Amendment.78 
The fact is, however, that the debate is narrowly 
circumscribed, rests on common legal ground, and is 
limited to a disagreement over the effectiveness of 
suspicion-based search programs. Both sides agree that 
“individualized suspicion” is not required in all contexts 
and that the effectiveness of a search program is key to the 
determination. They disagree, however, as to the 
effectiveness of suspicion-based searches in the public 
school context. Thus, Justice O’Connor wrote: “we have 
allowed exceptions in recent years only where it has been 
clear that a suspicion based regime would be ineffectual.”79 
In a surprisingly similar passage, Justice Scalia argued that 
because the Fourth Amendment has “no irreducible 
requirement of suspicion,”80 in situations where it would be 
“impracticable” due to “special needs” to determine 
individualized suspicion, a search will not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.81 Both sides agree that there ought to 
                                                            
76 Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
77 267 U.S. at 154. 
78 Justice O’Connor mentions the following scholarly resources: W. Cuddihy, 
The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning (1990) (unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation at Claremont Graduate school), which has since been turned 
into a book; Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the 
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 483 (1994); 
Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 
68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1994); LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION (MacMillan 1988).  
79 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 668 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
80 Id. at 653 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560-61). 
81 Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 973 (1987)).  
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be a preference for suspicion, but the crux of their 
disagreement is over the technical effectiveness of the 
search programs.  
(2) Border Patrol Roadblocks 
In another line of cases culminating in United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte,82 the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of fixed immigration checkpoints and there 
too held that suspicionless searches passed constitutional 
muster—more specifically, that Border Patrol agents require 
no articulable suspicion to stop and question motorists at a 
roadblock within 100 miles of the Mexican border.83  
The Martinez-Fuerte case arose from arrests made at 
two different permanent immigration checkpoints within 
100 miles of the Mexican border: one in California, the 
other in Texas. Both checkpoints were marked in the 
traditional fashion with large black-on-yellow signs and 
flashing lights, and subsequent warning signs as motorists 
got closer. At the first checkpoint in San Clemente, 
California, the point agent visually screened all northbound 
traffic, but did not conduct questioning there. Instead the 
agent would select a number of motorists for further 
investigation at a secondary inspection site, where other 
agents would stop and question the motorists about their 
citizenship and immigration status. At the time of the 
arrests at the San Clemente checkpoint, a magistrate had 
issued a “warrant of inspection” which authorized the 
Border Patrol to conduct roadblock operations at the site.84 
At the Sarita, Texas, checkpoint, Border Patrol officers 
would stop all northbound traffic for brief questioning, with 
the exception of local residents who the officers recognized. 
In contrast to the San Clemente checkpoint, there was no 
judicial warrant regarding the operations at Sarita.85   
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that 
neither articulable suspicion nor a judicial warrant was 
necessary as a precondition for a search at an immigration 
roadblock within one hundred miles of the border.86 In other 
words, no suspicion was required. Justice Powell wrote the 
opinion for the court and began by considering the balance 
of interests. Permanent checkpoints, the government had 
                                                            
82 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
83 Id. at 566-67. 
84 Id. at 545-47. 
85 Id. at 549-50. 
86 Id. at 566-67. 
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maintained before the Court, were “the most important of 
the traffic-checking operations.”87 They were also highly 
effective, Justice Powell suggested. The San Clemente 
checkpoint, for instance, resulted in the apprehension of 
17,000 illegal aliens in 1973 from about 10 million cars 
that passed through the checkpoint.88 Their effectiveness, 
Powell intimated, would be greatly diminished if stops had 
to be based on reasonable suspicion: such a requirement 
“would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be 
too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car 
that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of 
illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement would 
largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-
disguised smuggling operations, even though smugglers are 
known to use these highways regularly.”89 
By contrast, the intrusion on liberty was relatively 
minor—in Justice Powell’s words, “quite limited.”90 All that 
was required was a “brief detention of travelers,” “a 
response to a brief question or two,” and “possibly the 
production of a document evidencing a right to be in the 
United States.”91 Justice Powell emphasized that the 
subjective intrusion was “appreciably less in the case of a 
checkpoint stop.”92 These stops involve less discretion on 
the part of the agents, less interference with legitimate 
traffic, and less potential for abuse. Even the secondary 
stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, Justice Powell 
argued, were relatively minor. Those referrals were “made 
for the sole purpose of conducting a routine and limited 
inquiry into residence status” and involved an “objective 
intrusion” that “remains minimal,” Justice Powell 
suggested.93 “Selective referral may involve some annoyance, 
but it remains true that the stops should not be frightening 
or offensive because of their public and relatively routine 
nature.”94 As a result, and because of the more limited 
expectation of privacy in cars as opposed to homes, Justice 
                                                            
87 Id. at 556. 
88 Id. at 554. 
89 Id. at 557. 
90 Id. 
91 Id at 558 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 
(1975)). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 560. 
94 Id. 
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Powell concluded that no individualized suspicion at all was 
needed “at reasonably located checkpoints.”95 
Justice Brennan wrote a heated dissent, in which 
Justice Marshall joined. Justice Brennan described the 
result as the “defacement of Fourth Amendment 
protections,”96 declaring that “[t]oday’s decision is the ninth 
this Term marking the continuing evisceration of Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”97 What Brennan objected to most was the lack of 
any objective standard to evaluate the reasonableness of 
the stop. Whereas in previous cases—Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, United States v. Ortiz, and United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce—the Court had required some modicum of 
reasonableness,98 here the Court had abandoned the 
reasonableness standard completely.  “We are told today 
. . . that motorists without number may be individually 
stopped, questioned, visually inspected, and then further 
detained without even a showing of articulable suspicion, 
let alone the heretofore constitutional minimum of 
reasonable suspicion, a result that permits search and 
seizure to rest upon ‘nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches.’”99  
On our view, naturally, there was a level of suspicion 
at the roadblocks and the only important question would 
have been whether the hit rates at those checkpoints 
satisfied the minimum threshold to be established by the 
Court.  
(3) Other Contexts 
In addition, the Court has upheld a number of 
suspicionless search programs outside the criminal context, 
including inspections of commercial establishments100 and 
searches in correctional facilities.101 There are other cases, 
however, where, drawing on the very same logic and 
rationale, the Court has struck down suspicionless search 
programs. An example is Chandler v. Miller, where the 
Court reviewed the state of Georgia’s legal requirement that 
                                                            
95 Id. at 562. 
96 Id. at 569 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 567. 
98 See generally Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); United 
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. 
99 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 569-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
100 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
101 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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any candidate for state office pass a drug test.102 The 
Chandler Court held that the drug-testing program did not 
respond to a “concrete danger,” that there was no evidence 
of a particular drug problem, and that state office holders 
were not engaged in tasks that carried high risks or safety 
hazards for third parties.103 In other words, there was no 
special need or compelling state interest and no good 
reason to infringe on privacy interests.  
 The upshot of this line of cases is that suspicionless 
searches ought to be strictly curtailed to all but the most 
“exigent” circumstances, “after balancing the invasion of 
privacy against the government’s strong need.”104 The 
Court’s construction of the Fourth Amendment is that 
“individualized suspicion” should reign in the core criminal 
contexts of traditional policing, but that exceptions can be 
made outside that core context where the requirement of 
suspicion would render the program ineffectual and where 
there is both an important state interest and a limited 
infringement of privacy. 
But in all of these cases, the debate has been about 
suspicion-based versus suspicionless searches—and in that 
sense, they are all orthogonal to our argument.105 We are not 
arguing for suspicionless searches. To the contrary, we are 
demanding that a level of suspicion be established as a 
precondition to the constitutionality of the search. We are 
setting the level of suspicion as the baseline. If anything, we 
are demanding more than the Court does in the traditional 
crime-related policing context. We are asking that the 
actual level of suspicion be articulated on a probability 
                                                            
102 520 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1997). 
103 Id. at 318-19. 
104 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
105 There is, however, something very interesting about Vernonia. It turns out, 
actually, that there may have been a suspicion basis to the random drug testing 
program. The evidence of drug use from the school suggested—not only to the 
school authorities, but also to Justice Scalia—that the athlete students had a 
higher probability of using drugs; that the student athletes were, as a group, in a 
class of more-likely drug abusers. As the lower court found, and Justice Scalia 
noted, “athletes were the leaders of the drug culture.” Id. at 649. And it was this 
group that was singled out for random searches; as Justice Scalia emphasized, 
“The Policy applies to all students participating in interscholastic athletics.” Id. 
at 651. So, even though the Court and the parties considered the program 
“suspicionless,” there is reason to believe that there was, in fact, suspicion 
underlying the targeting of the school athletes. Depending on the level of 
suspicion, then, it could have been reasonable to use a targeted random testing 
program in our view.  
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scale and that all search programs be evaluated against 
that chosen level.  
Our challenge, then, is not to “individualized 
suspicion” as opposed to suspicionless searches. We are all 
for suspicion. Our trouble, instead, is with the idea of 
“individualized suspicion,” which, we believe, is a misguided 
add-on to the notion of suspicion.  
B. The Term “Individualized Suspicion” Is Misguided 
The term “individualized suspicion” is an empty 
concept that functions as a mere substitute for the term 
“constitutional.” This is evident in a case such as 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, where the Seventh Circuit and later 
the Supreme Court were called upon to decide the 
constitutionality of police roadblocks intended to detect 
drug contraband.106 A little background about the case first.  
On six occasions between August and November 
1998, the Indianapolis police department set up roadblocks 
on certain city streets to catch drug offenders. The locations 
of these roadblocks were determined weeks in advance 
based on information regarding area crime statistics and 
traffic flow. The roadblocks were conducted during the 
daytime and were identified with signs that read: 
“NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT __ MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS 
K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO STOP.”107 At each site, 
approximately thirty police officers were present, and they 
would stop a predetermined number of vehicles. A group of 
vehicles would be diverted to the search area, and the other 
traffic would then be allowed to go through until the police 
had finished processing the group of stopped vehicles.108 As a 
result, the searches were randomized at the checkpoint.  
During each stop, a police officer would approach the 
driver and request his or her driver’s license and car 
registration. The stopped cars and their passengers would 
then be subject to a plain view search of the interior 
through the car windows, and a dog-sniffing search of the 
exterior of the automobiles. According to the police, the 
entire process was designed not to exceed five minutes.109 
Over the course of the six roadblocks, 1,161 vehicles were 
stopped. The stops produced fifty-five drug-related arrests 
                                                            
106 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
107 Edmond, 531 US at 35–36. 
108 Id at 35. 
109 Id. 
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and forty-nine non-drug related arrests (for offenses such 
as driving with an expired driver’s license), resulting in a 
4.74 percent drug-arrest hit rate and an overall hit rate of 
8.96 percent.110  
The roadblocks, it seemed, had everything going for 
them: they distributed the costs of enforcement evenly 
across motorists, interfered as minimally as possible with 
the motorists’ movement, invaded only slightly motorists’ 
privacy interests, and, according to everyone on the 
Seventh Circuit panel at least, produced very “high” rates of 
successful searches.111 They were also randomly 
administered, which means that police officers could not 
individually discriminate against African-American 
drivers—or at least, less easily.112 Despite this, Judge Posner 
reversed the lower federal court—which had not enjoined 
the police practice—and put a stop to the roadblocks, 
resting the decision on the arguable notion that the police 
did not have any “individualized suspicion” to stop and 
question any motorist.113 Judge Posner, like most 
commentators, sought “individualized suspicion” and found 
none. Posner wrote, “here the roadblock is meant to 
intercept a completely random sample of drivers; there is 
neither probable cause nor articulable suspicion to stop 
any given driver.”114  
With respect to both statements, Judge Posner was 
formally correct. It is critical to see, however, that in the 
context of the checkpoint the second statement regarding 
probable cause and articulable suspicion was, in truth, 
inaccurate: for each driver, there was a 4.74 percent chance 
that he was carrying drugs. We know this after the fact, but 
we know it nonetheless. For each and every one of those 
automobile travelers, there was “individualized suspicion” 
of 4.74 percent. That is a very specific and articulable level 
of suspicion. Whether it is reasonable suspicion depends 
entirely on whether that level—4.74 percent—satisfies the 
quantum required by the Fourth Amendment. But that 
inquiry does not depend on whether the suspicion is 
“individualized” or not. It does depend on whether Judge 
Posner (or courts generally) thinks that 4.74 percent is a 
high enough probability that crime is “afoot” to justify 
                                                            
110 Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1999). 
111 Id at 662. 
112 Id at 663. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 663. 
Randomization and the Fourth Amendment 39 
 
interfering in an individual’s autonomy and privacy 
interests 
In truth, then, there was a level of suspicion that 
attached to all drivers. This notion of a quantum of 
suspicion is no different than in the classic case of witness 
identification. So, for instance, if a victim testifies that the 
perpetrator was a University of Chicago graduate student 
who wore Converse high-tops, and there are, say, 500 
graduate students at the University of Chicago who wore 
Converse high-tops out of a student body of 10,000, then 
we can easily conclude that our “individualized suspicion” 
to question U of C grad students who wore Converse high-
tops reaches 5 percent. We can quantify and establish 
before questioning the exact level of “individualized 
suspicion” that we require and determine whether it meets 
some minimum threshold to justify detaining and 
questioning any of those graduate students. 
The only difference between these two cases is a 
temporal one: we do not know the level of individualized 
suspicion in the roadblock case until after we have begun 
to conduct stops and visual and canine searches at the 
roadblocks. (Though here, since this involves a random 
sample of motorists, we can be pretty confident that we 
would have similar levels of suspicion at similarly selected 
sites in the near future. We could also obtain this 
information through research or surveys.) In the second 
case, we know ex ante from the witness identification and 
other information the level of suspicion and can use that to 
assess whether there is sufficient justification to stop and 
question individuals. In both cases, though, we can pretty 
easily determine the level of suspicion—the actual level of 
so-called “individualized suspicion.” 
In other words, there was “individualized suspicion” 
in Edmond. Judge Posner could have found “individualized 
suspicion” at the level of 4.74 percent. What he meant to 
say, of course, is that there was not enough suspicion, but 
here too he could easily have found that there was. The 
courts have never established a percentage requirement for 
individualized suspicion or probable cause, and as Chief 
Judge Easterbrook noted in dissent, individualized 
suspicion has been found at far less than 4.74 percent.115  
Again, what matters is the quantum of suspicion. 
Was there enough in Edmond? That would be the only 
proper question to ask in order to assess reasonableness of 
                                                            
115 Id. at 669-70 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
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the searches. The answer, though, is not so clear. These hit 
rates were perceived by the Seventh Circuit as successful in 
detecting illicit drug and other criminal violations. Judge 
Posner repeatedly referred to these hit rates as “high” and 
added that they are “vastly higher than, for example, the 
probability of a hit as a result of the screening of embarking 
passengers and their luggage at airports.”116 Judge 
Easterbrook, in dissent, similarly referred to the program in 
glowing terms: “The program is spectacularly successful as 
roadblocks go; 9.4% of those stopped are arrested, with the 
reason equally divided between driving and drug crimes.”117 
Citing the Martinez-Fuerte Border Patrol case and the 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz118 sobriety 
checkpoint case—cases which involved hit rates of 0.12 and 
1.6 percent respectively—Easterbrook noted that 
“[r]oadblocks with much lower rates of success have been 
held consistent with the fourth amendment.”119  
As a purely factual matter, though, the 4.74 percent 
drug hit rate—or, for that matter, the 8.96 percent overall 
hit rate including minor traffic violations120—is not really 
“spectacular,” as Easterbrook suggested.121 Hit rates from 
other law enforcement interventions have been far greater. 
For example, the Maryland state patrol between January 
1995 and January 1999 achieved drug contraband hit rates 
along Maryland’s I-95 corridor of 32 percent with regard to 
white drivers and 34 percent with regard to African-
American drivers.122 In Missouri for the year 2001, police 
traffic stops achieved drug hit rates—that is drugs only, not 
including faulty drivers’ licenses—of 19.7, 12.3, and 9.8 
percent respectively for whites, African-Americans, and 
                                                            
116 Id. at 662.  
117 Id. at 666 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting). We are not sure how Judge 
Easterbrook got to the 9.4 percent figure. Both Judge Posner and Justice 
O’Connor report similar search success rates of 104 motorists of a total pool of 
1,161, or 8.96 percent. See Edmond, 531 US at 35; Edmond, 183 F3d at 661 
(majority). 
118 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
119 Edmond, 183 F3d at 666 (Easterbrook, C.J. dissenting) (citing United States v 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543 (1976) and Michigan Department of State Police v 
Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990)). 
120 Id. at 661. 
121 Id. at 666 (Easterbrook, C.J. dissenting) (suggesting that the hit rate is 
“spectacularly successful”).  
122 Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the 
Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal 
Profiling More Generally, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275, 1292 (2004). 
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Hispanics.123 A 1982 Department of Justice study of airport 
searches using a drug-courier profile reported forty-nine 
successful searches based on ninety-six total searches, for 
a hit rate of 51.04 percent.124 A government report analyzing 
New York City stop-and-frisks, prepared in 1999, revealed 
average hit rates (stop-to-arrest) of approximately 13.7 
percent in situations found to present reasonable 
suspicion.125 In the abstract, devoid of any comparative 
evidence about search success rates in other contexts, the 
4.74 percent drug hit rate may well seem “high” or even 
“spectacularly successful”; however, that may be an artifact 
of judicial decisionmaking with no data, a perennial 
problem in constitutional criminal procedure.126 
Ultimately, courts should have to decide whether a 
4.74 percent probability of success is sufficient to satisfy 
the Constitution. But the decision turns on the quantum of 
evidence, not on whether it is “individualized” or not. If 
anything, the “individualized suspicion” construct prevents 
courts from conducting the right inquiry. 
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted, and 
as the plain text of the Constitution suggests, “the ultimate 
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is 
‘reasonableness.’”127 Our argument in no way casts doubt on 
that principle. It relies on it heavily. Our point is that the 
reasonableness of a governmental search does not turn on 
“individualized suspicion” but on whether it meets a certain 
level of suspicion.  
C. The Birth of “Individualized Suspicion” 
 The term “individualized suspicion” has become 
today a place holder for the conclusion that a search is 
“reasonable”—or for that matter, that there is “probable 
cause” or “articulable suspicion.” When courts find (or do 
not find) “individualized suspicion,” they are in fact merely 
using a substitute term for the idea of probable cause, a 
term which itself was never properly defined. The evidence 
                                                            
123 Id. at 1293. 
124 Harcourt, Against Prediction, supra note 12. 
125 See Tracey L. Meares and Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent 
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 733, 789 (2000). 
126 For an argument proposing increased use of social science evidence in 
constitutional criminal procedure, see generally id.  
127 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652. See also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147 (1925) (“The 
Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as 
are unreasonable.”) and all of the cases citing back to that famous statement.  
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surrounding the usage of the term “individualized 
suspicion” is entirely consistent with this.  
The term “individualized suspicion” dates from the 
mid-1970s and has mushroomed over the past few decades 
in both federal and state courts. One of the earliest uses of 
the term was, in fact, in the Martinez-Fuerte decision in 
1976.128 The term actually emerged hand-in-hand with two 
others—“particularized suspicion” and “unparticularized 
suspicion”—the latter term appearing first in Terry v. 
Ohio.129 It is impressive to look at the historical use of all 
three sets of terms.  
 As noted, the first, “individualized suspicion,” 
originates in the 1970s. The following graphs reflect the 
usage of the term in judicial decisions. The data were 
obtained using the LEXIS database. The first graph reflects 
usage of the term “individualized suspicion” in federal court 
cases, the second in state court cases: 
 
                                                            
128 See generally 428 U.S. 543.  
129 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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 Notice that there is a slight lag from the federal cases 
to the state cases, which reflects, naturally, that the term 
originated with the federal appellate courts. The following 
graph is the combined state and federal cases using the 
term “individualized suspicion,” and it reflects a relatively 
consistent upward trend, with 162 uses of the term both in 
2006 and 2007: 
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These graphs suggest that the term “individualized 
suspicion” emerged in the 1970s and caught on, somewhat 
contagiously. The pattern is entirely consistent with the 
idea that this new term took off as a way to render more 
concrete a notion of reasonable or articulable suspicion 
that—just like probable cause—was never specifically 
defined in probabilistic terms. The term “individualized 
suspicion” was intended to carry some substantive 
meaning, but it did not and does not today. It has become a 
rhetorical trope used to satisfy a standard that remains 
today undefined.  
Interestingly, this is true as well of the term 
“particularized suspicion.” The data on usage reveals a 
similar pattern. The first graph, again, traces the usage of 
the term in federal cases; the second, in state cases: 
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Again, the combined data for federal and state uses 
of the term show a relatively consistent increase, with a 
slight dip in the final year of the data (2007), but no 
indication of a significant shift in usage. 
 
 
 
The other interesting trend, then, is the use of the 
term “unparticularized suspicion” or “non-particularized 
suspicion,” which is the term that appeared first in Terry. If 
one searches the LEXIS database for those two terms 
(“unparticularized” and “non-particularized”) from Terry to 
the present, there are over 2,000 uses of the terms. Again, 
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the first two graphs are the federal and state usages, and 
the third graph contains the combined data: 
 
 
 
Randomization and the Fourth Amendment 47 
 
 
 
Here too, the trend is consistently upward and 
mirrors the usage patterns for the (inverse) terms of 
“individualized suspicion” and “particularized suspicion.”   
The bottom line is that these patterns are entirely 
consistent with our argument that the expression 
“individualized suspicion” has come to serve as a substitute 
for probable cause or articulable suspicion, terms that in 
truth were never properly defined by the Court.   
 
IV.  An Alternative Construct: Randomization 
 Our argument so far is that the term “individualized 
suspicion” is largely empty, and the courts have not used it 
to provide police with anything close to concrete guidance 
in assessing their practices. It is, instead, a rhetorical 
placeholder used to bless police practices without providing 
policing agencies with any guidance or requirements for 
structuring decisionmaking in a way that limits and shapes 
discretion. If offers simply no direction to policing and other 
law enforcement agencies to develop practices that 
appropriately constrain discretion.  
A. The Checkpoint as Loadstar 
In this Part, we suggest a construct that does: the 
checkpoint. Checkpoints, or roadblocks, look very different 
from the world of policing envisioned by the individualized 
suspicion paradigm. The individualized suspicion paradigm 
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imagines an officer, possibly roving, on the street making 
judgments about the suspicious nature of the activities, 
apparel, and appearance of individuals in a particular 
geographic area in light of that officer’s training and 
experience. When the officer stops or arrests someone, the 
Fourth Amendment question is whether the officer can tell 
a story that is sufficiently compelling to the decisionmaker 
so that he or she will conclude that there was 
“individualized suspicion” for the police action. The 
checkpoint paradigm is entirely different: on this model, 
there is a fixed roadblock established on the basis of a prior 
plan that has been approved by those who supervise the 
officers who will actually be conducting the searches. The 
reason for establishing the checkpoint already has been 
approved by superiors in advance. Critically, checkpoints 
would be constitutional only when every car is stopped 
unless a randomized stopping plan is adopted, as was the 
case in Edmond, and the resulting hit rate meets a certain 
level of suspicion.  
These last points, we contend, are the most 
important differences between the two models. Stops based 
on “individualized suspicion” attempt justification through 
the establishment of good reasons for interference, while 
checkpoint stops are justified primarily because there are 
no reasons for such actions beyond the justification for the 
checkpoint itself. Once the base level of suspicion has been 
satisfied, the stops are no longer justified by subjective 
beliefs, hunches, and prejudices about greater suspicion, 
but rather on the basis of evenhandedness.  
Although this may, at first glance, seem to disregard 
constitutional norms, it is precisely what promotes the core 
constitutional values in the Fourth Amendment context. 
Take a moment to consider a key danger of the 
individualized suspicion regime, namely the cost of being 
incorrectly targeted for police intervention. In a world in 
which the police must have good reasons for interfering 
with a person’s autonomy, the stakes of incorrect decisions 
are far higher. In the current constitutional regime, what 
makes a decision by a police officer a good one is whether 
we believe that officer has correctly (or correctly enough) 
identified or targeted a potential offender. As Sherry Colb 
elegantly explains, this targeting harm is a cost to 
individuals, in addition to the distinct costs of autonomy 
invasion and of privacy curtailment.130 When police get it 
                                                            
130 Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1456 (1996). 
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right, we do not care very much about the targeting costs. 
But when they get it wrong, those costs become a great 
concern in terms not only of the costs to the individual but 
also to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. And 
the fact is, the police stop and arrest many, many more 
people than are ultimately charged or convicted of crimes. 
In contrast to “individual suspicion” stops, random 
checkpoint stops are not justified with reference to good 
reason, but because of randomization. Police are not 
required to have a good reason to stop a person at a 
checkpoint once there is a justification for that checkpoint 
procedure. It is enough that the person stopped is the third 
or fifth or thirteenth in line—or that the person is in the cue 
if every car is stopped. Importantly, while there may be no 
good reason for any particular car to be stopped, it should 
be clear that there is a complete absence of bad reasons. 
This is so because a randomization program effectively 
strips officers from exercising any discretion to stop 
individual cars. Indeed, if an officer does exercise 
discretion, then that officer’s actions would make the 
checkpoint unconstitutional. And note that since we can be 
confident that police officers operating a checkpoint cannot 
exercise their discretion to make bad decisions, there is no 
targeting harm from a checkpoint-based stop for any 
individual. 
The effect on the targeted population is likely to be 
immense. To see this, consider two different types of search 
paradigms, the Michigan v. Sitz checkpoint on the one 
hand, and the Whren v. United States131 “individualized 
suspicion” model on the other. If one were to draw a 
distributional curve of the different groups of people who 
are stopped at a typical checkpoint in an “average” 
neighborhood, it would look like this. 
 
                                                            
131 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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In the typical checkpoint, the median person stopped 
is likely to be the median population member. Also, note 
that the bulk of people stopped are likely to cluster around 
the median. By contrast, if one were to draw a 
distributional curve of the group of people stopped under 
the regime approved in Whren, it would look like this. 
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Here the tail on the left side of the curve reflects that 
the median person stopped is poorer, Black and less 
educated than his counterpart on the Sitz curve.  
As a result, the two regimes impose potential costs 
with respect to targeting harms in predictable and troubling 
patterns. One way of understanding the central claim of the 
Randomization and the Fourth Amendment 51 
 
defendant in Whren is that the police use of traffic 
violations as probable cause to justify the investigation of 
other suspected offenses (such as drug offenses) imposes 
the costs of law enforcement on a group that is 
demographically aggregated in a predictable way. The costs 
are even higher when the aggregation occurs at the 
intersection of demography and geography. This 
aggregation phenomenon helps to “race” crime in a 
particular way.132 
B. Evidence of Racing Crime 
And the best available evidence suggests that this 
racing effect is a real problem today. The data and analyses 
on police stops consistently reveal disproportionate stops of 
African-Americans and Hispanics. The evidence is 
overwhelming.  
In 2007, the RAND Corporation issued a report on 
the racial disparities in the stop, question, and frisk 
practices of the New York City Police Department (NYPD). 
Using data on all street encounters between NYPD officers 
and pedestrians in 2006, RAND found that although 
consistent estimates could not be obtained on any racial 
disparities in stop rates (due to the sensitivity of the data to 
the type of benchmark used to compare), officers frisked 
whites less than they frisked similarly situated nonwhites 
(29 percent of stops, compared to 33 percent of stops). 
Search rates were roughly the same across races, at 6 
percent to 7 percent (although the study notes that in 
Staten Island, the search rates of minorities was 
significantly greater); officers successfully recovered 
contraband less from minorities than similarly situated 
whites. Specifically, the success rate for blacks was 5.7 
percent, 5.4 percent for Hispanics, and 6.4 percent for 
whites.133 
The data and analysis confirmed the earlier studies 
of NYPD stops conducted by Jeff Fagan and Andrew 
Gelman. They analyzed 125,000 pedestrian stops by the 
NYPD from January 1998 to March 1999 and, using 
hierarchical multilevel models to adjust for precinct-level 
variability, they nevertheless found that African-Americans 
and Hispanics were stopped more frequently than whites, 
                                                            
132 Cf. David James piece on Ghetto; Meares on prison as race-making; Eli 
Anderson’s new book. 
133 Greg Ridgeway. Analysis of Racial Disparities in the New York Police 
Department’s Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices, The RAND Corp. xii-xiv 
(2007). 
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even after controlling for precinct variability and race-
specific estimates of crime participation.134 
[INSERT GRAPH OF 2006 STOPS IN NYC] 
In fact, study after study reveals discrimination. In 
August 2008, Professor Ian Ayres of Yale University 
published a study on police stops by the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD).135 Ayres analyzed data obtained from 
over 810,000 “field data reports” collected by the LAPD from 
July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004 (field data reports are 
completed whenever a police officer makes a pedestrian or 
motor vehicle stop). Ayres found that there were more than 
4,500 stops per 10,000 African-American residents, 
whereas there were only 1,750 stops per 10,000 white 
residents. In two neighborhoods, Central and Hollywood, 
Ayres actually found that “there were more stops of African 
Americans in one year than there were African American 
residents, meaning that the average number of stops per 
resident was greater than one.”136  
Ayres controlled his findings for variables such as 
the rate of violent and property crime, and found that the 
disparity was not the result of different crime rates in 
different areas—the stop rate per 10,000 residents was 
3,400 stops higher for Blacks than Whites, and more than 
350 stops higher for Hispanics than Whites. Once stopped, 
Blacks were 29 percent more likely to get arrested than 
Whites, and Hispanics were 32 percent more likely. Police 
were 127 percent more likely to frisk or pat down stopped 
Blacks than stopped Whites, and 43 percent more likely to 
do so for Hispanics. While minorities were more likely to be 
stopped and then searched once stopped, the results of 
these searches were less productive than comparable 
searches with white residents. Searched Blacks were 37 
percent less likely to be found with weapons than searched 
Whites, 24 percent less likely to be found with drugs, and 
25 percent less likely to be found with other contraband. 
Similarly, searched Hispanics were 33 percent less likely to 
be found with weapons, 34 percent less likely to be found 
with drugs, and 12 percent less likely to be found with 
other contraband. The race of the stopping officer also 
                                                            
134Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Alex Kiss, An analysis of the NYPD’s stop-
and-frisk policy in the context of claims of racial bias, Working paper Dec. 14, 2005, 
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/frisk7.pdf. 
135 Ian Ayres, Racial Profiling and the LAPD: A Study of Racially Disparate 
Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police Department, (2008) http://www.aclu-
sc.org/lapdracialprofiling (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
136 Id. at 5. 
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mattered—the disparities found decreased when the officer 
was of the same race as the person who was stopped.  
A few months earlier, in April 2008, the ACLU of 
Arizona released a study analyzing the first full year of data 
on highway traffic stops collected under a settlement 
agreement with the Arizona Department of Public Safety—
the period spanned July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007.137 The 
analysis revealed that patrol officers searched African-
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans at a higher 
rate than Whites or other minorities: Blacks and Hispanics 
who were stopped by police were searched 10 percent of the 
time and Native Americans 13 percent of the time. By 
contrast, Whites, Asians, and Middle Easterners were 
searched around 3 to 5 percent of the time. The study 
found no evidence to support such differential treatment by 
race—on average, 34 percent of Whites searched were 
found with contraband, while only 22 percent of Hispanics 
searched were found with contraband. Blacks were found 
with contraband at similar rates as Whites (38 percent), but 
were twice as likely to be searched. Middle Easterners, who 
were searched at slightly higher rates than Whites (5 
percent, compared to the 4 percent search rate of Whites), 
were found with contraband only 24 percent of the time. 
Additional evidence of differential racial treatment was 
found in the disparity of stop duration by race. Overall, 
minorities were held for longer periods during police stops, 
excluding stops that involved searches. 
In a follow-up study commissioned by the Arizona 
Department of Public Safety using an additional six months 
of data, the researchers found that, conditional on being 
stopped, racial disparities existed in the outcome of the 
stop, even after controlling for other explanatory factors.138 
Whites were more likely to receive warnings (44.6 percent of 
stops) than Blacks (41.3 percent of stops) and Hispanics 
(only 33.6 percent of stops). By contrast, Hispanics and 
Blacks were more likely to be cited than Whites (48.9 
percent for Hispanics, 48.1 percent for Blacks, and 43.4 
                                                            
137 ACLU of Arizona, Driving While Black or Brown (2008), 
 http://www.acluaz.org/DrivingWhileBlackorBrown.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 
2009). 
138 Robin Engel, Jennifer Calnon Cherkauskas, and Michael R. Smith, Traffic 
Stop Data Analysis Study: Year 2 Final Report, University of Cincinnati 
Policing Institute 2008, 
http://www.azdps.gov/agreement/pdf/DPS_Year_2_Stop_Data_Report_2008.pd
f. The study was commissioned by the law enforcement agency and it 
emphasized that no department-wide conclusions could be made on any racial 
disparities in stopping behavior. 
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percent for Whites). Hispanics, Blacks, and Native 
Americans were all significantly more likely to get searched 
or arrested. Whites were arrested only 2.1 percent of the 
time, while Native Americans were arrested 5.4 percent of 
the time, Blacks 4.2 percent of the time, and Hispanics 3.9 
percent of the time). Hispanics were searched at an 8.6 
percent rate, Blacks at 7.5 percent, Native Americans at 6.9 
percent, and Whites at 3.3 percent. All results were 
statistically significant at the .001 level.139 Analysis of the 
percentage of searches that successfully found contraband 
showed that for non-consent discretionary searches, 
searches of Hispanics had the lowest success rates (37.5 
percent); in comparison, the success rates were 52.9 
percent for Native Americans, 50.4 percent for Whites, 50.0 
percent for Blacks, and 46.4 percent for other races.  
 In February 2009, the state of West Virginia issued 
its “Traffic Stop Study” final report for 2008.140 The state 
found that on average, Blacks were 1.64 times more likely 
to be stopped by police than Whites, and Hispanics were 
1.48 times more likely to be stopped than Whites. Blacks 
and Hispanics were also more likely to be searched than 
Whites, with the rate of being searched at 10.64 percent for 
Blacks, 10.24 percent for Hispanics, and 4.32 percent for 
Whites. While the rates of being stopped and searched were 
higher for minorities, the contraband “hit rates” (the rate at 
which contraband is found in a search) were lower. The hit 
rate for Blacks was 43.11 percent, 30.23 percent for 
Hispanics, and 47.17 percent for Whites. Finally, the rates 
of receiving a citation and/or getting arrested were higher 
for Blacks (57.34 percent) and Hispanics (60.92 percent) 
than for white drivers (46.52 percent). Similar results were 
found on data at the county and agency level.  
In mid-2009, Alexander Weiss and Dennis P. 
Rosenbaum of the University of Illinois at Chicago Center 
for Research in Law and Justice issued the 2008 annual 
report on traffic stops for the state of Illinois—the fifth 
annual traffic stop report based on data collected annually 
starting in 2004 required under state law due to allegations 
of racial profiling.141 Weiss and Rosenbaum found that 
                                                            
139 Id. at 53-54. 
140 Stephen M. Haas, Erica Turley, and Monika Sterling, West Virginia Traffic 
Stop Study: Final Report, Criminal Justice Statistical Analysis Center, 2009 
http://www.wvdcjs.com/trafficstops/index.html (vast visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
141 Alexander Weiss and Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Illinois Traffic Stops Statistics 
Study 2008 Annual Report, University of Illinois at Chicago Center for Research 
in Law and Justice 2009, 
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minority drivers were around 13 percent more likely to get 
stopped than white drivers. Once stopped, minorities were 
around 10 percent more likely to receive a citation. 
Specifically, 64 percent of Blacks were cited, 69 percent of 
Hispanics, 65 percent of Asians, and 70 percent of Native 
Americans, compared to 58 percent of Whites. In terms of 
searches, Hispanic drivers were 2.4 times more likely to be 
subjected to a consented search than white drivers, and 
black drivers 3 times more likely. While minorities were 
about 2.5 times more likely to be searched than Whites, 
they were less likely to be found with contraband. Searches 
of white drivers turned up contraband 24.4 percent of the 
time, while searches of minorities did so only 15.1 percent 
of the time—in other words, police were searching 
minorities more even though searches of Whites found 
contraband 1.6 times more than searches of minorities.142  
 These reports extend a long and consistent history of 
studies documenting racial profiling in American policing 
across the country. Earlier in 2007, for instance, the RAND 
Corporation had issued its report on racial disparities in 
the stop, question, and frisk practices of the New York City 
Police Department.143 And a year earlier, in 2006, the 
Northeastern University Institute on Race and Justice had 
issued a report on traffic stop disparities in Rhode Island.144 
The study found that minorities were subjected to searches 
at over twice the rate compared to Whites (13.6 percent for 
minorities, 6.3 percent for Whites). Limiting the data to only 
discretionary searches (searches not incident to a lawful 
arrest) still found minorities being searched at twice the 
rate of Whites, with minorities being searched at 5.9 
percent and Whites being searched at 2.9 percent.145 While 
minorities were searched at twice the rate as Whites, the 
productivity of searches was less for minorities than 
Whites. For discretionary searches, Whites had a 26.5 
percent hit rate, while minorities had a 22.3 percent hit 
rate.146 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.dot.state.il.us/travelstats/ITSS%202008%20Annual%20Report.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2009).  
142 Id. at 12-13. 
143 Ridgeway, supra note 133. 
144 Amy Farrell and Jack McDevitt, Rhode Island Traffic Stop Statistics Data 
Collection Study 2004-2005, Northeastern University Institute on Race and 
Justice (2006). 
145 Id. at 68-70. 
146 Id. at 78. 
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More recently, on June 30, 2009, the ACLU released 
its report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination: The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic 
Profiling in the United States.147 The report catalogued the 
independent and ACLU-based evidence of racial profiling in 
22 states and the federal government, describing in an 
intricate and detailed 98-page report all the evidence for 
racial profiling by state and local law enforcement. The 
report concluded that both data and anecdotal evidence 
revealed that minorities in the United States are being 
subjected to racial profiling in spite of the numerous public 
statements by state and federal government officials that 
the practice of racial profiling should end. Anecdotal 
examples of racial profiling—such as the illegal deportation 
of a cognitively impaired U.S. citizen from Los Angeles 
because officials did not believe he could possibly be a 
citizen148 or Detroit police officers accused of conducting 
bare-hand searches of genitals on a number of young black 
males149—were supported by analyses of state level data 
from Minnesota to California finding consistent patterns of 
racial minorities being over-stopped, over-searched, and 
over-frisked in comparison to Whites.150 
C. Other Costs of “Individualized Suspicion”  
There are additional differences between “individual 
suspicion”-based stops and checkpoints. If we define 
autonomy costs as the length of detainment, the amount of 
time any one person spends in a checkpoint tends to be 
shorter than the typical suspicion-based stop. The 
checkpoint also limits discretion in another way—by 
enhancing the political accountability of policing agencies 
to the people who are policed. 
The primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to 
curtail, constrain, and shape police discretion, and only 
randomization fulfils that function. As the graphs above 
demonstrate, the more likely it is that the typical person 
who encounters the police in a checkpoint reflects the 
median voter in a given community, the more likely it is 
that police will be attentive to the demands of that voter 
                                                            
147 ACLU, Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A 
Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (2009),  
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf.  
148 Id. at 46. 
149 Id. at 56. 
150 Id. at 41-68. 
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when shaping and developing policy. Discretion constraint 
plus enhanced accountability help ensure that checkpoints 
satisfy Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 
The additive impact of these benefits will lead, we 
think, to fewer illegitimate invasions of individual autonomy 
and privacy. Moreover, we should expect law enforcement 
agencies to be more effective and efficient. Even if the same 
number of people may be stopped that are stopped today, 
they will be stopped for shorter period of time and for the 
purposes of enhancing more accurate targeting if and when 
suspicion-based engagement is appropriate. Because the 
suspicion-based stops will be more accurate, fewer people 
will be wrongfully stopped.  
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D. Ensuring Privacy Interests 
Many may object that our approach does not 
adequately protect the value of privacy at the heart of the 
Fourth Amendment. As Justice O’Connor and others have 
repeatedly stated, “Protection of privacy, not 
evenhandedness, was then and is now the touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment.”151 That objection, however, is 
mistaken.  
We disagree. Under our scheme, privacy is protected 
by requiring a certain level of suspicion. What we propose is 
to have our cake and eat it, too: to have privacy and 
evenhandedness. The two constitutional values are not 
mutually exclusive or in a zero-sum contest. 
The point is best illustrated, actually, by returning to 
the precise discussion of this issue by Justice O’Connor in 
the public school randomized drug-testing case—precisely 
where she inveighs against evenhandedness. Justice 
O’Connor is discussing and embracing an original intent 
analysis of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the 
question of searching shops and vessels on the sea. 
O’Connor notes that, most telling of all, “the particular way 
the Framers chose to curb the abuses of general warrants—
and by implication, all general searches—was not to impose 
a novel ‘evenhandedness’ requirement; it was to retain the 
individualized suspicion requirement contained in the 
typical general warrant, but to make that requirement 
meaningful and enforceable, for instance, by raising the 
required level of individualized suspicion to objective 
probable cause.”152 
O’Connor then turns to the example of the original 
congressional authorization regarding duty collector’s 
searches of possibly concealed goods subject to import 
duties. There, warrants were required in the case of any 
search on land; however, for searches at sea, warrants were 
dispensed with but Congress nevertheless “limited officials 
to searching only those ships and vessels ‘in which [a 
collector] shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or 
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.’”153  
                                                            
151 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
152 Id. at 670. 
153 Id. at 671, quoting The Collection Act of July 31, 1789, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 
(emphasis added).  
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O’Connor maintains that it is precisely this 
requirement of suspicion that protected privacy. O’Connor 
writes: 
True, not all searches around the time the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted required individualized 
suspicion—although most did. A search incident to 
arrest was an obvious example of one that did not, 
but even those searches shared the essential 
characteristics that distinguish suspicion-based 
searches from abusive general searches: they only 
"affect one person at a time," Krull, 480 U.S. at 365 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), and they are generally 
avoidable by refraining from wrongdoing. Protection 
of privacy, not evenhandedness, was then and is now 
the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.154 
 It is precisely the fact that there is suspicion that 
satisfies privacy requirements. And evenhandedness is no 
substitute for the protection of privacy, the Court has 
emphasized. Justice O’Connor writes:  
The Court clearly indicated that evenhanded 
treatment was no substitute for the individualized 
suspicion requirement: “It would be intolerable and 
unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized 
to stop every automobile on the chance of finding 
liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the 
highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such 
a search.”155 
We fully embrace this reasoning: We are not arguing 
for evenhandedness as a substitute to suspicion, but as a 
complement to privacy.  
We are not asking for suspicionless randomized 
searches. On the contrary, we want the level of suspicion 
spelled out. By ensuring a minimum level of suspicion, we 
ensure the protection of privacy. Our argument, in essence, 
is that the entire process of weighing governmental 
interests against privacy interests is a charade and that it 
can be replaced, very simply, by a determination of the 
threshold level of probable culpability tied to a level of 
offense. And we believe that this can be achieved in 
practice.  
E. Measuring Suspicion 
                                                            
154 Id. at 671. 
155 Id. at 668-69. 
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As we have demonstrated elsewhere, it is in fact 
possible to measure the level of suspicion associated with 
group-traits and to assess whether that level of suspicion 
satisfies a constitutional standard—assuming that the 
Supreme Court were to articulate such a standard in 
probabilistic terms.156 Our earlier discussion was set in the 
context of the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. 
Wardlow,157 where the Court was asked to determine 
whether a police officer’s stop of a suspect, after the 
suspect fled upon seeing several police cruisers patrolling 
an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, violated the 
Fourth Amendment. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, 
decided that the stop was constitutional, and reversed the 
Illinois Supreme Court’s decision to the contrary. 
The way we framed the case was to explore, 
empirically, whether flight from the police is really a good 
indicator of guilt; and what we attempted to show is that 
there actually was good evidence to guide the resolution of 
that question. Neither the majority nor the dissent looked to 
empirical evidence in Wardlow, choosing instead to answer 
the question with reference to commonsense judgments. 
What we tried to show, by contrast, was that the 
constitutional issue was precisely the kind of question for 
which there may have been an empirical answer.  
In particular, we turned to a pathbreaking study of 
street stops in New York City released on December 1, 
1999—about six weeks before Wardlow was published.158 
The New York OAG study was an analysis of 175,000 forms 
collected over one year, using as well census data, crime 
statistics, and demographic information to yield a 
statistically valid, quantitative view of the practice of “stop 
and frisk.”159 The New York OAG Report collected, in 
                                                            
156 Meares and Harcourt, supra note 125, at 789. 
157 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000). 
158 Although the report was not issued early enough for it to be included in the 
briefs in the case, it was available to the Justices when they wrote the opinion. 
We explore the report here as an example of evidence that could be used in 
making a reasonableness determination rather than condemning the court for 
overlooking the report. 
159 The forms that provide the fodder for this analysis are known as “UF-250s.” 
According to the NYPD’s Patrol Guide, a police officer who stops and frisks an 
individual must complete a UF-250 if a person is (1) stopped by force; 
(2) stopped and frisked; (3) arrested; (4) stopped and refuses to identify oneself. 
Id. at 89.  In situations that fall outside these four contexts, a police officer may 
fill out a form if he or she desires to do so.  The pool of forms analyzed in the 
study contained about three quarters mandated reports and the rest voluntary.  
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addition to racial breakdowns on stops and frisks, a 
measure of how “good” those stops were: how many of the 
stops led to an arrest. Citywide, that ratio was 9:1.160 That 
is, nine stops were made by the NYPD for every arrest.161 
But the OAG Report contained more fine-grained 
information. The study collected information on a sample of 
stops162 based on facts that, as reported by the police, 
clearly met the constitutional standard of reasonable 
suspicion according to Terry and its progeny.163 
Additionally, the study collected information on stops based 
on facts that courts have decided clearly do not constitute 
reasonable suspicion.164 Moreover, the report collected 
information pertinent to the very facts in Wardlow—
suspects who flee from the police in high crime areas. The 
table on the following page summarizes the OAG Report. 
With respect to the particular issue presented in 
Wardlow, the chart provides a fascinating picture of police 
work. Stops reported as undertaken because the suspect 
fled the scene result in a high stop-to-arrest ratio—a ratio 
of 26:1. That ratio is quite close to that of stops based on 
factors generally understood to fail to satisfy reasonable 
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Note that even 
when flight in a high crime area is considered, the ratio 
between stops and arrests lowers, but it does not lower by 
much. It stands at 20.3:1. (These data support the Wardlow 
dissenters’ argument that flight may be caused by a whole 
host of reasons that are not indicative of criminal activity.)  
Importantly, however, the Wardlow Court did not 
discuss merely the suspicious nature of flight generally; 
rather, the Court assessed whether flight “upon noticing the 
police”165 or “flight [that] was motivated by the presence of a 
                                                                                                                                     
Id. at 91.  The forms covered stops that occurred in 1998 and the first three 
months in 1999.  Id. at v. 
160 Civil Rights Bureau, Off. of the Att’y Gen., The New York City Police 
Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practice: A Report from the Office of the Attorney 
General, (December 1, 1999) (hereinafter “OAG Report”). 
161 See id. at 111. 
162 For this portion of the analysis, a sample of 15,000 out of the database of 
175,000 stops were used.  See id. at 135. 
163 Categories of stop rationales were developed, and then the UF-250 forms 
were coded in accordance with these categories.  See id. at 135-36.  The 
researchers discussed with lawyers for the OAG the constitutional standard to 
code, and a great deal data was excluded as providing insufficient data, as the 
summary table below indicates. 
164 See id. at 135. 
165 120 S.Ct. at 676. 
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police officer”166 was suspicious enough to justify a police 
stop. The researchers who analyzed the data in the New 
York OAG Report categorized this more specialized type of 
flight in a category separate from the general flight category. 
The ratio between stops and arrests with respect to flight to 
elude the police suggest a tighter relationship than the 
general flight code. Indeed the 15.8:1 ratio of stops to 
arrests for this category is quite close to the ratio of the 
other categories of information for stops deemed insufficient 
to determine constitutionality with confidence—an 
indication that Wardlow is indeed the close case that it 
appears on first impression to be. When the data on flight 
to elude police are confined to high crime areas—the very 
context presented by the facts in Wardlow—a different 
relationship between stops and arrests emerges. But not 
what one would expect! These data reveal a stop-to-arrest 
ratio of 45:1. 
Table: Summary of the OAG Report 
 Total Stops Stops 
Resulting in 
Arrest 
Ratio of Stops 
to Arrest 
Facts articulate 
reasonable 
suspiciona 
 
2,678 
 
368 
 
7.3 
Facts do not 
articulate 
reasonable 
suspicionb 
 
673 
 
23 
 
29.3 
Insufficient 
informationc 
 
1,032 
 
76 
 
13.6 
Flight Aloned 
Fleeing crime 
scene 
Attempted flight 
 
104 
79 
 
4 
5 
 
26 
15.8 
Flight in High 
Crime Area 
Fleeing crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
166 Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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scene 
Attempted flight 
61 
45 
3 
1 
20.3 
45 
Total167 4,383 467 9.4 
This astoundingly high relationship between stops 
and arrests is suggestive that in high-crime urban 
                                                            
167 Explanatory notes for categories above: 
aThe researchers considered these categories of information reported by an 
officer as evidence meeting the reasonable suspicion justificatory standard:  
crime observed (observed drug sale, jumping turnstile/metrocard fraud, theft of 
service, buy & bust, graffiti); fit description (fit description, 
identified/information from third party at scene, bail jumping, known and 
wanted by police/active warrant); weapon observed (waistband activity, bulge in 
waistband, observed object that could be (appeared to be) gun weapon, laser 
light activity/toy guns); suspicious plus (eluding the police plus other factors, 
location prone to robbery plus suspicious behavior (pacing, talking to known 
dealers, loitering), carrying theft equipment/other paraphenalia, 
placing/retrieving object (drugs), location known for drug activity plus 
“suspicious behavior” (pacing, standing around talking with passersby or known 
drug dealers), location known for prostitution plus suspicious behavior, 
suspected break-in/burglary/on fire escape, extended observation of suspicious 
activity (trying multiple car doors, extended observation activity, walking back 
and forth on same street for period of time, etc.).  
 
bThe researchers considered these categories of information reported by an 
officer as evidence not meeting the reasonable suspicion justificatory standard, 
rendering the reported stop unconstitutional:  Activity deemed suspicious 
(pocket/clothing activity, bulge in clothing, attempting to elude police, 
suspicious behavior (nervousness, pacing), suspicious clothing, association with 
a suspect/person arrested/known dealer, gang affiliation (known member or 
clothing), loitering, known to police, loitering on subway platform, looking in to 
parked cars/trying one door, black or silver object/exchange of object; wrong 
place (location (out of place), location known for drug activity, location prone to 
robbery/burglary/grand larceny, location known for prostitution.  
 
cThe researchers considered these categories of information reported by an 
officer as evidence insufficient to determine whether or not meeting the 
reasonable suspicion standard was met:  person in area that crime or suspicious 
activity was reported, fleeing crime scene, suspected drug sale, observed drug 
use, suspected alcohol consumption/open bottle, observed alcohol 
consumption/open bottle, moving furniture/carrying out of place objects 
(computers), panhandling, insufficient information, knife in pocket, questioned 
individual in an ongoing investigation. 
 
dThe data on flight were categorized in two ways:  attempting to elude police, 
eluding police plus other factors/suspicious activity, and fleeing the crime scene.  
The researchers considered information relevant to the first category evidence of 
an unconstitutional stop, and they considered evidence relevant to the second 
category insufficient to make a determination.  We are grateful to Jeffrey Fagan, 
Center for Violence Research and Prevention, Columbia University for the 
analysis of stops and arrests based on the flight codes. 
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communities where the population is disproportionately 
minority, flight from an identifiable police officer is a very 
poor indicator that crime is afoot. But more importantly, for 
our purposes here, the data suggest that it is possible to 
measure the level of suspicion attaching to group-based 
categories. The data in the chart above provide a 
comparative measure of the intrusiveness of police stops for 
different categories of reasons. 
The difficulty, of course, is that the Supreme Court 
has never used exact proportions to explain the level of 
certainty a police officer must possess under the 
reasonableness approach.168 Our point is that this 
deficiency can be cured.169  
                                                            
168 Rather than emphasizing a particular quantum of evidence necessary to 
justify a stop under the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court has emphasized 
the factual basis for the stop by requiring an officer to review all those factors 
that motivated him to act.  See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981). 
Despite the Court’s reluctance to discuss the level of certainty probabilistically, 
there is evidence that decision-makers assess the level of evidence that justifies 
different police actions in implicit probabilistic terms.  For example, in one 
study, 96 out of 166 federal judges surveyed indicated a belief that the 
reasonable suspicion standard requires 40 percent certainty or less that evidence 
of crime would be found by an officer after a stop. See C.M.A. McCauliff, 
Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional 
Guarantees? 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293, 1327  tbl. 3 (1982). In the same study, 25 
percent of the judges indicated that 50% certainty was necessary for reasonable 
suspicion, while another 19 percent indicated that 60 percent certainty or more 
was necessary. This empirical evidence makes it quite clear that Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence leaves open just how much liberty should be 
circumscribed. 
  
169 We would also suggest that, for serious crime, the level of suspicion could be 
lower than for trivial offenses or misdemeanors. If the offense is in fact trivial, 
perhaps we should augment the level of suspicion, in part because the triviality 
of the offense in all likelihood suggests that the general level of offending in 
society is probably higher. There is a sense in which we do that, intuitively, in 
many criminal contexts. In the case of conspiracy, for example, we require a 
higher level of evidence of intentionality to support a conspiracy or complicity 
charge. So, for example, when an individual who provides telephone message 
service to the public is accused of conspiring with prostitutes, we may require 
more evidence of intentional aiding in order to prove a conspiracy. We may not 
be as willing to impute intent based on knowledge—based on the fact that the 
telephone message provider simply knows that his customers include prostitutes. 
However, we may be willing to impute intent if an individual is accused of 
facilitating a terrorist act if, with knowledge, that individual sells a service that 
furthers the terrorist act. This is, famously, the distinction drawn in the Lauria 
case. See People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471 (Cal. District Ct App. 1967) 
(greater level of evidence of intent required in conspiracy case involving 
prostitution). The same type of distinction may apply in the Fourth Amendment 
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V.  Implementation Challenges and Some Objections 
It is crucial to compare and evaluate different Fourth 
Amendment approaches against the appropriate baseline. 
That baseline is how police power is exercised today, not in 
some idealized world. We need to compare our proposal to 
actual police practices, not perfect or idealized possibilities. 
And while we may well agree that checkpoints might be 
intolerable in an idealized world, that world is not the one 
in which we live. The issue is whether the evenhandedness 
of randomized policing may improve the current situation, 
and here we believe that the answer is yes.  
A. Models of Suspicion-sufficient Randomized Policing 
Before addressing some objections, though, let us be 
more precise about the exact kind of policing that we are 
proposing. Here are five examples of randomized police 
practices that we believe would satisfy constitutional values 
and improve on current police practices by promoting 
evenhandedness while ensuring the protection of legitimate 
privacy interests.  
(1) Randomized consent searches on the highway: 
Rather than allow the police to use profiles and hunches to 
seek consent to search on the highway, highway patrol 
officers would be instructed to seek consent to search 
vehicles in every third or fifth (or, if they have the time, 
every) stop of a vehicle traveling at a designated speed, for 
instance, 90 to 95 miles per hour on even days and 85 to 
90 mph on odd days. The evidence from traffic stops across 
the country suggests that, as the amount of discretion in 
the stopping and searching decreases, the racial 
disproportionality of the stops also decreases.170 This 
randomized approach would protect privacy, since it is 
based on a traffic violation (excessive speeding), and at the 
same time ensure evenhandedness.  
(2) Randomized evening street stops-and-frisks in 
diverse socio-economic neighborhoods: Instead of allowing 
targeted stop-and-frisk activity in minority, high-risk 
neighborhoods only, urban police officers would be 
instructed to conduct evening stop-and-frisks in, say, five 
different neighborhoods of diverse socio-economic and 
demographic composition. In each location, police officers 
would be asked to stake out a block or intersection and 
                                                                                                                                     
context: we may require a higher threshold of suspicion in the case of more 
ordinary misdemeanors or more trivial felonies. 
170 See expert report in Desoto NJ case.   
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then to stop, interview, and frisk each tenth (or fifth or 
twentieth, depending on traffic) person who walks by them. 
Police officers would hand each person searched a card 
with information about the search program. If the search 
program did not net the requisite level of suspicious activity 
(including drug contraband, firearms, etc.), then all persons 
searched under the program would be entitled to monetary 
compensation. As in all large metropolitan areas today, 
police would fill out a contact card for each stop-and-frisk 
encounter, which would make data collection very easy. 
(3) Randomized subway and bus searches of bags 
and pat-down: Here too, the idea would be to substitute a 
randomized program for the type of more targeted anti-
terrorism searches of bags in the subway post 9/11. Again, 
the police would be directed to locate themselves in such a 
way as to diversify the populations that they encounter. The 
searches would be conducted on a random basis (fifth, 
tenth, or twentieth person entering the station or boarding 
the bus) and would be accompanied by an information card 
in the event that the search program does not meet the 
threshold requirement of suspicion.  
(4) Randomized DUI roadblocks: These would 
involve randomized administration of breathalyzer tests at 
roadblocks located at various diverse neighborhoods in the 
city or along roads in diverse rural areas. These too would 
be monitored and evaluated on a monthly basis and subject 
to the requirement that information be distributed for 
eventual compensation if the level of DUI detection falls 
below the minimum level of suspicion.  
(5) Randomized investigation of trades on any 
stock for which there is an important disclosure of good or 
bad corporate news: Here, federal investigators would 
randomly select and investigate persons who bought or sold 
a quantity of shares in a company that, within a certain 
period of the trade, announces significant news affecting 
the stock price. The investigation could include the power of 
subpoena for phone records, etc.  
These are just five examples, naturally, and the list 
could go on, for example, to include random IRS audits, 
immigration checks, or even random computer scans for 
illegal downloads or child pornography.  
We suspect that you may be saying to yourself that 
these police practices seem extreme and somewhat 
totalitarian. You may think that people will think they are 
unfair and illiberal, even perhaps un-American—that we 
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have forgotten the lessons of the American Revolution. (Or 
something to that effect.) Our response may sound 
condescending, and for that we apologize (especially to our 
readers who may have extensive or other experience with 
police searches). But here we go anyway: the reason that 
you may be having that response, very likely, is because 
you may be part of an elite in the United States that is 
relatively sheltered from police stops and frisks. But for 
most young men living in the inner-city, this is the 
American experience. Let’s remember that in 2008 the 
NYPD stopped and frisked 531,159 individuals, and that 
about 90 percent of those stops and frisks resulted in no 
arrest or summons. That is half a million stop and frisks. 
Now many of us have not experienced those kinds of police 
practices because many of us are not the “usual suspects.” 
But for many youth in poor urban neighborhoods, being 
stopped and frisked is a common experience. What we are 
proposing, in effect, is simply to distribute more 
evenhandedly the burden of making us all safe and secure. 
  
B. Compensation Questions 
There is, today, no system of compensation for 
wrongful searches and the existing mechanisms to police 
the Fourth Amendment—predominantly Section 1983 civil 
rights suits—are inadequate to the task.  
We propose compensation primarily because the 
level of suspicion for randomized search programs often will 
be difficult to ascertain ex ante, before the search program 
has been implemented. Under these circumstances, we 
believe that persons who are subject to randomized 
searches where there is ultimately an insufficient level of 
suspicion should be compensated for their time and 
inconvenience; by contrast, individuals who are 
inconvenienced at a proper checkpoint, where there is 
ultimately sufficient suspicion, should view the 
inconvenience as part of their civic obligations to ensure 
safety for all. We also propose compensation in order to 
incentivize the police to achieve the minimum level of 
suspicion that would be eventually set by the Supreme 
Court.  
Under our proposal, a police department would only 
need to compensate individuals wrongfully searched (i.e. 
not arrested or fined) at a checkpoint if the overall level of 
suspicion at that checkpoint did not reach the minimum 
constitutional level required. In all cases where the 
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randomized search program does achieve the base level of 
successful searches, individuals at those checkpoints would 
not be compensated. Moreover, as discussed further below, 
individuals who are wrongfully searched outside the context 
of a checkpoint would also automatically be entitled to 
compensation with an additional penalty for their targeted 
harm.  
Compensation is not without its problems. First, it 
may create some moral hazards. It is possible, for instance, 
that some people will be drawn to checkpoints in order to 
receive compensation, which would effectively reduce the 
hit rate at the checkpoint and make compensation even 
more likely. Second, the compensation scheme may also 
make the entire policy seem more unfair if compensation is 
being awarded in the higher-income neighborhoods 
(because of lower hit rates) and not in the inner-city 
neighborhoods (because of higher hit rates). This latter 
point would militate in favor of not awarding compensation 
based on the hit rate and level of suspicion, but instead to 
all persons who are wrongly searched. Third, compensation 
may reduce the positive effects of policing since it 
represents a cost that will have to be internalized by the 
policing budget. There will be costs associated with the 
compensation scheme, including not only the compensation 
itself, but also administration, notification, disputes over 
claims, etc. If the costs are high, it may reduce the number 
of people that can be searched, which will further reduce 
the effects of policing—perhaps, the total level of deterrence, 
incapacitation, or retribution. In other words, there will be 
costs associated with any such program that may take 
away from the benefits. 
These problems are by no means trivial. However, 
they need to be weighed against the important goal of 
ensuring evenhandedness in our policing. The turn to 
randomization means that certain policing programs will 
need to be implemented without ex ante knowledge of the 
exact level of suspicion and that calls for compensation for 
those who are burdened by those unsuccessful programs. 
We believe that some of the administrative costs will be 
absorbed by the new record-keeping requirements—in other 
words, there will be some economies of scale given current 
oversight. In most large metropolitan areas, the police are 
already required to gather information for each stop and 
frisk. Each time a police officer searches a suspect, they are 
already required to fill out a form. As a result, the 
information gathering and dissemination associated with a 
potential compensation scheme should not increase those 
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costs much. Moreover, there may be less civil rights 
litigation as a result of a more routine compensation 
scheme—in the same way that workman’s compensation 
schemes decrease some litigation costs. But there is no 
question that, overall, the very fact of compensation will 
increase costs. There is no easy way out of this dilemma. It 
has to be that we, as a society, value the benefits of 
evenhandedness enough to outweigh those costs and are 
thereby willing to invest additional resources into the 
problem.  
C. Pooling Issues 
One of the largest issues in terms of implementation 
concerns how the pools of individuals will be constructed 
for purposes of randomization. As the illustrations above 
suggest, most of the pooling that we envisage will be 
determined by space and time, rather than by additional 
group traits. In other words, instead of randomizing within 
a suspect group-trait, we propose randomizing by location 
and time. As a result, the pooling issues will be determined 
by the location of the checkpoint at the particular subway 
stop or street intersection and by the time of day.  
D. Some Objections 
It is important to emphasize a few points before 
addressing some recurring objections.  
First, using the checkpoint as the Fourth 
Amendment loadstar would not mean that the police could 
not also engage in the more traditional police practices of 
stopping and searching a suspect who is walking out of a 
bank with a ski mask over his face and a bag full of money. 
The constitutionalization of a randomization paradigm 
would not make it necessary to stop and search everyone 
surrounding the bank. It would not necessitate 
randomization in more conventional Warrant Model 
situations.  
If the police have a compelling reason to stop a 
suspect outside of a randomized program, then that stop 
would be treated as if it had an n of 1. If the search does 
not produce anything, then the individual must be 
compensated, and perhaps compensated at a higher rate 
than for randomization programs that do not reach the 
designated level of suspicion because the targeted harm to 
the profiled individual searched is greater. Since there is no 
randomization program in place here, and no other search 
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results to aggregate, the search must compensated if 
unsuccessful.  
Second, there is no doubt that using checkpoints will 
not, by itself, cure all the evils of racial profiling. So, for 
instance, if the police set up their roadblocks all on the 
South Side of Chicago or only in African-American 
neighborhoods, the distribution of arrests will inevitably be 
skewed along racial and socio-economic lines, very much 
like it is under the Whren model. Similarly, if the police use 
as their randomizing variable one that correlates with race, 
the police will be functionally profiling on race.  
However, there are reasons to believe that these 
problems would be minimized under a random search 
paradigm—for two reasons in particular. First, the police 
themselves have an incentive to distribute searches widely 
so as to police all neighborhoods in the city, not just the at-
risk neighborhoods. In order for the police administrators to 
have an effective police force throughout the city, they will 
have to set up randomized search programs in diverse 
neighborhoods. If they limit themselves to targeted policing 
for the lower-crime neighborhoods, they will be subjecting 
themselves to far greater costs of compensation, since each 
wrongful search will have to be compensated, and perhaps 
compensated even more if there is an added price to 
targeted harms. So in order to ensure police protection 
across the city, the police administrators will need to 
distribute search programs throughout the city.171  
Second, distributing the burden of policing within 
neighborhoods would put political pressure on the city to 
distribute the burden more widely throughout the city. The 
wider distribution of the costs of policing, even within a 
neighborhood, and the resulting political pressure that the 
wider distribution will trigger, will likely put pressure on 
city administrators to distribute more widely the costs of 
policing. Even within a socio-economically depressed 
neighborhood, traditional forms of profiling are condoned in 
large part because they fall on the most marginalized 
                                                            
171 To be sure, the police today also have an incentive to police the entire city, 
they do police all neighborhoods, and despite that, they target stops and frisks 
disproportionately on certain groups and in certain neighborhoods. The problem 
today is not that the police do not police higher-income neighborhoods, but that 
they target their stops-and-frisks on certain identifiable populations and in 
certain parts of town.  Under our scheme, the practices would be made more 
consistent across neighborhoods. It is the consistency in practices that would 
make all the difference. The police would have the same incentive to police all 
neighborhoods, but would be required to do so in the same way. 
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populations in that neighborhood. By distributing the costs 
more widely, there is likely to be greater attention to any 
neighborhood-to-neighborhood disparities in the burden of 
policing.172 
 Let us turn then to some objections.  
First, a reader may object that profiling is more 
efficient than randomized searching and that there is no 
reason to search low-probability suspects at checkpoints. 
This is a common reaction to our proposal and it can be 
expressed along any of the dimensions of policing that we 
discuss—whether it involves searching grannies and 
toddlers at the airport or auditing low-income taxpayers on 
April 16th. This argument from efficiency, however, is 
misplaced for a number of reasons.  
The first reason is that, as a practical matter, 
profiling and statistical discrimination likely increase the 
overall rates of the targeted crime under the conservative 
assumption that the targeted population is less elastic than 
the non-profiled group. There are long-term substitution 
effects and a ratchet effect on the profiled group that, in all 
likelihood, is counter-productive to the law enforcement 
goal of fighting crime. In other words, profiling is not likely 
to be more efficient. One of us has dedicated a full length 
treatment to this point and we will not rehash it here.173 The 
basic point here is that we cannot be so sure about the 
efficiency gains of profiling and therefore that we should not 
be so willing to trade-off the distributional concerns and the 
problems of subordination.  
The second reason, though, is equally important: we 
are not dealing with public policy in this essay, but with 
constitutional interpretation. There is no reason to believe, 
ex ante, that the constitutional values we hold so dear 
coincide with the most effective policing techniques. There 
is no necessary overlap of the Constitution on one hand 
and public policy on the other. Or to say this in another 
way, it is possible that the new constitutional paradigm 
may allow, as a constitutional matter, some policing 
                                                            
172 Here too, naturally, the greater diffusion of searches may trigger political 
resistance in the more affluent neighborhoods; however, it is hard to imagine 
that any neighborhood would want to do without policing. Policing is, after all, a 
“good” and tends to be viewed as a desirable public service. Once again, the 
consistency in the police practices is what would serve to distribute the burdens 
of policing.  
173 See Harcourt, Against Prediction, 2007. 
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practices that we do not embrace as a policy matter—and 
vice versa. Efficiency is not the litmus test of constitutional 
interpretation. Now, in this particular case, we believe that 
suspicion-sufficient randomized search program not only 
would satisfy the constitutional values of evenhandedness 
and privacy-protection, but would also be wise public 
policy. We believe that the embrace of randomization would 
not only promote the kind of evenhandedness that will 
ultimately reduce bias and the disparate racial impact of 
policing, but also improve our policing practices. However, 
we would argue for this constitutional change even if it did 
have costs in efficiency. 
One further point on this matter. One may not 
believe that the courts and constitutional interpretation are 
necessarily the right device to use to address the 
fundamental problem of racial injustice in police patrolling. 
Undoubtedly, it would be better to look elsewhere than 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. The rate of review is low and 
review comes late, plus the consequences of violations are 
largely insured against today, with immunities for police 
officers, etc. It is undoubtedly true that the values of the 
Fourth Amendment—privacy and evenhandedness—could 
be better implemented through administrative measures 
within police forces that reward (or punish) officers or 
supervisors for disparate hit rates along race lines, for 
instance. We do not argue, however, that there should be 
exclusive reliance on the courts or that the constitutional 
standard we advocate is a better way of achieving a less 
biased society. We are simply dealing in this essay with the 
constitutional standard to apply. In other words, even if one 
does not think that the courts are the best or even a good 
vehicle, one would want the constitutional standard to 
reflect the values we hold dear—privacy and 
evenhandedness. Our central point is that it is rarely 
related to issues of evenhandedness—and that is something 
we seek to redress.  
 Second, some readers may object that there are 
really two separate projects here: one involves abandoning 
the “individualized suspicion” standard, the other 
embracing randomization, and the two are not necessarily 
related to each other. Our response is that they are 
inextricably linked. The reason is that once you abandon 
the “individualized suspicion” standard and adopt a 
requirement that searches achieve a designated level of 
suspicion, it is important to then introduce the element of 
evenhandedness. It is important, in effect, to limit the focus 
on suspicion so that it does not have devastating 
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distributional and subordinating consequences. In other 
words, we should not seek to simply increase as much as 
possible the level of suspicion (which protects only privacy), 
but should simultaneously, over a certain level of suspicion, 
protect the other value of evenhandedness at the heart of 
the Fourth Amendment.  
 Third and finally, some readers may object that the 
overall result might be too little policing. Assuming with 
Randall Kennedy and others that policing is a “good,” some 
may argue that requiring checkpoints in high-income 
neighborhoods will incentivize the more politically powerful 
elites to minimize policing, which would effectively reduce 
the amount of policing in high-crime neighborhoods below 
the levels required there for safety and protection. The fear 
here is not that the randomized searches would be too 
oppressive, but rather that there would not be enough of 
them. Our answer here is simple: it is unlikely that a 
constitutional standard, alone, will resolve all public policy 
questions and achieve a perfect equilibrium of policing in 
society. There may in fact be slight deviations from 
perfection. But we should not expect the constitutional 
standard to achieve perfection. It pushes in the right 
direction, we believe, and that is far better than the system 
that we have in place now. We need to compare what we are 
proposing against the reality of today’s policing.  
E. Apples to Apples 
To be sure, there are some implementation 
challenges. But again, that is equally, if not more true in 
the case of “individual suspicion” searches. The challenges 
there are well illustrated, again, in the Edmond case. For 
what that case demonstrates well is that the 
constitutionality of a search under the “individualized 
suspicion” model is likely to turn on the judge’s decision 
whether to evaluate the search program at the level of the 
entire roadblock program or at the level of an individual 
stop. Judge Posner made this clear in the very first 
paragraphs of the opinion: if the court were to adopt a 
program-level analysis, Judge Posner suggested, then the 
court would perform a cost-benefit analysis and the 
outcome would most certainly favor law enforcement. Most 
program-level evaluations of costs and benefits do. But if 
the court were to adopt an individual-level assessment 
focused on “individualized suspicion,” the outcome would 
likely differ. Judge Posner wrote: 
Whether the seizures effected by Indianapolis’s drug 
roadblocks are reasonable may depend on whether 
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reasonableness is to be assessed at the level of the 
entire program or of the individual stop. If the 
former, these roadblocks probably are legal, given 
the high “hit” rate and the only modestly intrusive 
character of the stops.174 
In this sense, the distinction between program-level 
and individual-level analyses tends to be outcome 
determinative under the “individualized suspicion” 
approach. The program-level assessment triggers a cost-
benefit analysis that, under Judge Posner’s analysis, favors 
law enforcement in practically all cases. The major cost in 
the case of the Indianapolis roadblocks was the waste of 
time and invasion of privacy suffered by each person 
stopped and questioned; other costs included the 
opportunity cost of using those police officers on more 
pressing police business—such as solving or preventing 
serious crimes like murder or robbery—the equipment costs 
associated with setting up a barricade, and the costs of 
publicizing and justifying the intervention (maybe the police 
department had to issue a press release and conduct a 
press hearing, etc.). The benefits of the program included 
the detection of drug contraband, the detection of derelict 
drivers who either had no registration or no licenses, and 
the deterrent effect on illicit drug consumption associated 
with the publicity surrounding the program—what Judge 
Posner referred to, earlier, as “the deterrence of drug 
offenses produced by these hits.”175 A program-level cost-
benefit analysis would compare the aggregated costs and 
benefits. As Judge Posner suggested, at the program level 
the equation would likely favor the roadblocks because of 
the supposedly large deterrent effects.176 
                                                            
174Edmond, 183 F3d at 661 (majority). 
175 Id. at 662. 176 Id. Judge Posner held that in conventional criminal law enforcement settings, 
an individual-level assessment is ordinarily appropriate: “courts do not usually 
assess reasonableness at the program level when they are dealing with searches 
related to general criminal law enforcement”—or at least, “ordinarily” so. Judge 
Posner, reviewing prior cases, found several exceptions to the ordinary situation. 
Those exceptions included, first, the case where police officers have information 
that a dangerous criminal is escaping along a certain route. Here, there is 
heightened risk that allows for preemption in favor of program-level review. 
Second, there is an exception when law enforcement face a terrorist threat. 
Judge Posner offered the following example: “if the Indianapolis police had a 
credible tip that a car loaded with dynamite and driven by an unidentified 
terrorist was en route to downtown Indianapolis, they would not be violating the 
Constitution if they blocked all the roads to the downtown area even though this 
would amount to stopping thousands of drivers without suspecting any one of 
them of criminal activity.” Id. at 663. In this case of national emergency, the 
court should switch to the program-level review. Judge Posner identified a third 
exception for regulatory measures such as sobriety checkpoints or other 
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 Under our proposed approach, checkpoint searches 
would be analyzed on a program-level basis, but the use of 
a program-level approach would not necessarily bias the 
determination in the direction of rubberstamping all 
checkpoints. The determination of the constitutionality of 
the checkpoint would stand or fall instead on the rate of 
success of the police intervention—in other words, on 
whether the level of detection satisfied the minimum 
requirement of reasonable suspicion set by the Supreme 
Court as the probability of detection of crime. Each 
checkpoint, then, would have to be evaluated, either ex ante 
or ex post, based on the level of detection of crime that is 
achieved at the checkpoint in relation to the level of 
detection that society considers necessary to satisfy Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness. 
 Since it is practically impossible to know ahead of 
time the exact level of detection that is likely in many 
situations, a checkpoint model of policing would need to go 
hand-in-hand with a compensation framework for the set of 
individuals burdened by an unreasonable checkpoint 
search.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
The Supreme Court has tailored Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence to fit the exception. The cases that best fit 
the notion of “individualized suspicion” are those rare cases 
in which police attempt to track down clearly identified 
assailants, where evidence of the committed crime is 
plentiful, and where it converges on one individual. But 
such cases are truly exceptional. The more typical policing 
situation is one in which the relevant officers have no idea 
who the offenders are and rarely know the specific crime 
that has been committed. The typical case is about 
hunches, guesses, and intuitions about crime—cases in 
which police attempt to prevent crime as opposed to 
investigating crime that has been committed. These cases 
represent the vast majority of policing, and the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that the Court has developed 
simply does not fit this vast majority of cases. As a result, 
                                                                                                                                     
randomized search programs involving drug testing for law enforcement officers 
or railroad engineers; and a fourth exception for immigration checkpoints 
searching for illegal immigrants or contraband crossing the borders. In all these 
exceptional cases, Judge Posner declared, courts reviewing police practices 
should and do properly adopt a program-level cost-benefit analysis—which, not 
surprisingly, results in their being found constitutional. 
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the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not able to 
ensure the constitutional values that we hold most dear—
limiting discretion, reducing racial discrimination, and 
promoting autonomy in interactions that citizens have with 
law enforcement agents.  
 It is time to discard the “individualized suspicion” 
standard. The expression is a misleading, conclusory, and 
substantively contentless term, which has distorted Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. It has become, over time, a 
substitute for the expression “reasonable suspicion” to the 
detriment of constitutional interpretation because it has 
distracted courts and other criminal justice actors from 
focusing on what is truly important—namely, the level, the 
amount, the degree of reliable suspicion. Thus, instead of 
helping to guide relevant legal system actors to determine 
the quantity of suspicion necessary for government action 
in particular cases, the term “individualized suspicion” has 
functioned as a legal rubric that masks the actual basis of 
the judicial decision. It captures, essentially, the 
conclusion—namely, that the search is constitutional—
without offering any reasoning.  
 The central impulse at the heart of this essay is the 
desire to cabin police discretion so as to avoid socio-
economic and racial discrimination, and to distribute more 
evenly the costs of policing throughout society. The legal 
concept of “individualized suspicion” does not advance 
either of these two goals—and does not have any other 
redeeming virtue. It is, in essence, a semantic hat-trick that 
masks the underlying factors that produce a constitutional 
conclusion. The concept of “individualized suspicion” needs 
to be abandoned, and we need instead to explore the 
virtues of randomization that are at the core of the 
checkpoint paradigm.  
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